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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)0). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the conditional proposed 
settlement presented by the parties to the court constituted a binding and enforceable 
contract and settlement agreement. This issue was preserved in the trial court by Ward's 
Objection to the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (R. 1315-82). Standard of 
Review: Whether a contract exists is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness giving 
no deference to the trial court's determination of the issues presented. Herm Hughes & 
Sons. Inc. v. Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Brighton to pave a private roadway 
across Ward's property and whether Brighton should be ordered to remove the paved 
roadway and restore Ward's property to its original condition. Brighton's motion to pave 
the roadway was granted without notice or an opportunity for Ward to be heard. 
However, Ward did file an objection to the proposed order, which objections were denied. 
See Objection to Proposed Order Allowing Plaintiff to Pave Private Roadway (R. 1284-
1306). Standard of Review: This issue revolves around whether the pavement of the 
private roadway was allowed by a contract between the parties (i.e., the proposed 
settlement agreement). Whether a contract exists is a conclusion of law reviewed for 
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correctness giving no deference to the trial court's determination of the issues presented. 
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in ruling on summary judgment (1) that Ward 
must compensate Brighton for all further costs, including attorney's fees, associated with 
any review by Brighton of any new plans submitted by Greg Ward as a condition of 
reviewing those plans; (2) that it was reasonable for Brighton to require a licensed 
architect to sign any plans for the cabin as a condition of reviewing any plans; and (3) that 
it was reasonable for Brighton to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone 
ordinance of Salt Lake County in reviewing plans submitted by Ward. This issue was 
preserved below by Ward's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (R. 881-
960). Standard of Review: Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a 
conclusion of law reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's 
determination of the issues presented. Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 
(Utah 1993); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
4. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to consider at trial the latest set of 
plans submitted to Brighton by Ward. The Court ruled over Ward's objection that it 
would not consider the latest set of plans submitted to Brighton by Ward. (Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 1., R. 1750:32-50). Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation 
and application of the unambiguous terms of the November 3, 1999 Order which set forth 
the issues to be tried should be reviewed under the same standard as the interpretation of 
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an unambiguous contract, that is, as a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness giving 
no deference to the trial court's determination of the issues presented. Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). 
5. Whether the trial court erred in ruling at the trial of this matter that the plans 
submitted by Ward were properly rejected by Brighton. This was the issue tried by the 
court and was preserved below during the entire trial proceeding. (Trial Transcripts, 
Vols. 1-3, R. 1750-52). Standard of Review: The trial court's determination that approval 
of the plans had not been unreasonably withheld constitutes the interpretation of a 
contract that is reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's 
determination of the issues presented. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 
1991). 
6. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Carl Eriksson, who was 
both an expert witness and a fact witness, to testify at the trial of this matter. This issue 
was preserved at trial through Ward's objection to the trial court's disallowance of the 
testimony of Carl Eriksson (Trial Transcript, Vol. I, R. 1750:224-30) and Ward's Motion 
to Reconsider Disallowance of Testimony of Carl Eriksson (R. 1533-45) which was 
denied. Standard of Review: The admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). 
7. Whether the trial court erred in denying Ward's application for 
determination that consent to build the cabin had been unreasonably withheld after the 
July 13, 1995 evidentiary hearing. This issue was preserved for trial throughout the 
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hearing held on this issue (Transcript of July 13, 1995 Hearing, R. 1753). Standard of 
Review: The trial court's determination that approval of the plans had not been 
unreasonably withheld constitutes the interpretation of an unambiguous contract that is 
reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's determination of the 
issues presented. Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991V 
8. Whether the trial court erred in not recusing Judge David S. Young for bias 
and prejudice and whether the Supreme Court should order that Judge David S. Young be 
recused from this action for bias and for denying Ward his due process rights tliroughout 
the proceedings below. This issue was preserved through Ward's Motion Requesting 
Recusal and Reassignment (R. 651-77) and Ward's objections to the trial court's rulings. 
Standard of Review: The refusal to recuse Judge Young is a legal conclusion reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). The constitutionality of a 
trial court's actions are considered conclusions of law reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1991) (in the criminal context reviewing whether trial court 
had substantially complied with constitutional requirements for entry of guilty plea). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
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Rule 601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Every person is competent to testify to be a witness except as otherwise 
provided in these rules. 
Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
A witness may not testify as to a matter unless evidence is introduced 
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of 
the matter. 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1997) 
Whenever a party . . . shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before 
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any 
opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, 
except to call another judge to hear and determine the matter. Every 
affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or 
prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case has 
been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known No party shall be 
entitled in any case to file more than one affidavit.... 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E.1 
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law. 
Utah Constitution. Article L § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the attempt by Gregory M. Ward ("Ward") an owner of real 
property in Brighton, Utah to build a family cabin on his property (the "Property"). The 
Property is subject to restrictions in a Special Warranty Deed that provide that the 
Property "shall be limited to the construction of a single residential building containing 
not in excess of twelve hundred square feet on each floor, and not containing more than 
two floors." Special Warranty Deed (Trial Exhibit 44) (attached as Exhibit A to 
Addendum). The Special Warranty Deed also gives Brighton Corporation ("Brighton"), 
an adjoining landowner, the right to review and approve plans for the cabin and provides 
that Brighton shall give such approval in a "timely" manner and not unreasonably 
withhold such approval. Id. This is an appeal from judgment of the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, after bench trial, and from the prior interlocutory orders 
entered by the court, all related to Brighton's refusal to approve Ward's plans for a cabin. 
B. Course of Proceedings in the Trial Court 
This action was filed by Brighton on August 29, 1994, seeking, among other 
things, to enjoin Ward from building a cabin on his property without approval from 
Brighton. Complaint (R. 1-19). A hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction was 
held on September 26, 1994 (Transcript at R. 1742). The Court entered a preliminary 
injunction preventing the defendant Ward from proceeding with the construction of his 
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cabin or even obtaining a building permit without approval from Brighton. October 4, 
1994 Order 308-16). Ward does not appeal that ruling. 
Ward subsequently submitted revisions of the 1994 plans to Brighton in an attempt 
to obtain approval to build his cabin. The revised plans submitted by Ward contained 
only two floors and no more than 1,200 square feet on each floor in compliance with the 
Special Warranty Deed. See Application for Determination that Approval Has Been 
Unreasonably Withheld. (R. 317 - 420). Nevertheless, Brighton refused to approve the 
plans. On July 13, 1995, the Court denied a motion by Ward requesting an order that 
Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval of the plans. See August 15, 1995 Order. 
(R. 467) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit G). 
Ward submitted new plans to Brighton for approval after the July 1995 hearing. 
These plans also complied with the "two floors" and "1,200 square feet" requirements. 
Nevertheless, Brighton refused to approve the plans. (See, e.g. Affidavit of Mary Barton, 
R. 501 - 524). Ward filed a renewed motion for an order that Brighton was unreasonably 
withholding approval. (R. 468-70). However, the Court refused to hear Ward's motion, 
ruling that Ward would have to proceed to trial. June 25, 1996 Order (R. 612-13). 
On or about May 16, 1997, Ward filed a motion requesting the recusal of Judge 
Young based on the fact that Brighton's counsel played an active and advertised role in 
Judge Young's retention election campaign in 1996. (R. 651-53). The court denied the 
motion. See June 9, 1997 Minute Entry (R. 718-21) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit H). 
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On December 22,1998, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
requesting that the Court rule as a matter of law (1) that Ward must compensate Brighton 
for all further costs, including attorney's fees, associated with any review by Brighton of 
any new plans submitted by Greg Ward as a condition of reviewing those plans; (2) that it 
was reasonable for Brighton to require a licensed architect to sign any plans for the cabin; 
and (3) that it was reasonable for Brighton to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay 
Zone ordinance of Salt Lake County in reviewing plans submitted by Ward. (R. 802-04). 
The Court granted the summary judgment motion in an order dated March 3, 1999. (R. 
1185-88) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit I). 
Trial was scheduled for March 3, 1999. (R. 1005). On that day the parties 
informed the Court of a proposed conditional settlement. The parties requested and 
obtained a new trial date in the event the settlement was not accomplished. On 
September 3, 1999, Brighton filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. (R. 1197-
99). In this motion, Brighton requested that the trial court allow it to pave the gravel 
roadway running across Ward's property in violation of the Property Use Agreement's 
requirement that the road remain a gravel road. The court granted Brighton's motion in 
chambers on September 8, 1999, before Ward had an opportunity to respond to the 
motion. See Affidavit of Douglas J. Parry in Support of Petition for Emergency 
Extraordinary Writ ("Parry Aff.") at 1fl| 9-13 ( f i l ed i n Appellate Case No. 990845) 
(attached to Addendum as Exhibit J). The court's ruling was reflected in a September 21, 
1999 order. (R. 1392 - 94) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit K). 
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On November 3,1999, the court entered an order holding that the parties had 
entered into a binding settlement agreement and that the trial scheduled for November 17-
18, 1999, would be on the issue of whether the plans submitted by Ward to Brighton after 
the hearing on March 3, 1999, complied with the settlement agreement. See November 3, 
1999 Order (R. 1417 - 18) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit L). 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
Trial was held on November 17-19, 2000. The trial court ruled, among other 
things, that the trial would be held on whether plans submitted by Ward in June 1999 
complied with the conditional settlement agreement. The court refused to consider later 
plan revisions that had been submitted by Ward on October 6, 1999 (the "October 1999 
Plans"). The court held that the June plans did not comply with the conditional settlement 
agreement and that Brighton properly refused to consider the October 1999 Plans. See 
February 3, 2000 Order (R. 1690 -92) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit M). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Background 
In 1941 Fred and Sarah Moreton (Ward's grandparents) acquired real property in 
Brighton, Utah. See, e.g.. Transcript of September 6, 1994 hearing (R. 1743:44-45; 
1743:75). The Moretons built a family cabin on the property. Id, In 1969, the Moretons 
placed the property into Brighton Corporation, their family corporation, and gave one-
fifth of the stock of the corporation to each of their children-Mary Barton, Isabel Coats 
(Wardfs mother), Ed Moreton, Fred Moreton, and Sarah Kunz. (R. 1743:46-47; 1743:75). 
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In July 1990, the five children decided to divide and distribute the assets of 
Brighton Corporation among themselves. (R. 1743:47; 1743:75). The real property was 
valued at approximately $265,000. The property was divided into three parcels—the main 
parcel, which included the existing family cabin, and two adjoining parcels. (R. 1743:48; 
1743:75). The adjoining parcels were to be subjected to certain restrictive covenants. (R. 
1743:49). The children drew lots and, in accordance with the draw, one child chose the 
main parcel, two children chose the two adjoining parcels with some cash, and the other 
two children chose to receive $53,000 in cash. (R. 1743:48-49; 1743:75). 
Mary Barton drew the first lot and chose the main parcel. (R. 1743:49). Mary 
Barton is, for all purposes, Brighton Corporation. (R. 1743:4; 1743:75). Isabel M. Coats 
acquired the adjoining parcel of property to the west of the main parcel (the "Property") 
by Special Warranty Deed executed on July 3, 1991. (R. 1743:50; 1743:75; Trial Exhibit 
44).l A Property Use Agreement was also entered into by the parties on July 3, 1991. 
(See Trial Exhibit 45). The Appellant Gregory M. Ward acquired the Property from his 
mother, Isabel M. Coats, in August 1994. (R. 1743:207). This litigation was commenced 
in August 1994 by Brighton Corporation (Mary Barton) to enforce the restrictions in the 
Special Warranty Deed against her nephew, Gregory M. Ward. 
B. The Restrictive Covenants 
The Special Warranty Deed provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
]Mary Barton was the grantor of deed to the property acquired by Isabel M. Coats. 
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BUILDING RESTRICTIONS. The above-described premises shall be 
limited to the construction of a single residential building containing not in 
excess of twelve hundred square feet on each floor, and containing not more 
than two floors.... 
Grantor expressly reserves the right to review and approve the proposed 
placement, plans, and designs for any improvement to be located upon the 
above-described property, which approval shall be timely and shall not be 
unreasonable withheld. 
Trial Exhibit No. 44 (attached to Addendum as Exhibit A). 
The Property Use Agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
. . . the designated 20 foot right-of-way as described on the deed from 
Brighton to Coats as used for roadway purposes shall consist of a single 
lane gravel roadway for vehicular t ravel . . . . 
Property Use Agreement (Trial Exhibit No. 45) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit B). 
C. Facts Related to Specific Issues on Appeal 
The following Statement of Facts is organized by the facts relevant to each of the 
issues on appeal. 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in determining that the conditional proposed 
settlement presented by the parties to the court constituted a binding and 
enforceable contract and settlement agreement. 
On March 3, 1999, the parties in this case informed the trial court that they were 
contemplating a settlement of this action. March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745) (attached 
to Addendum as Exhibit C). The genesis of the proposed settlement began with an 
October 28, 1998 letter sent by Brighton to Ward proposing a manner of resolving the 
dispute between the parties and requesting that Ward make certain revisions to prior 
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plans. October 28, 1998 letter (Trial Exhibit No. 2) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit 
D). Ward submitted plans to Brighton on February 5, 1999. 
On February 22, 1999, Brighton sent a letter to Ward rejecting those plans for 
three general reasons: (1) the plans were allegedly incomplete and lacked necessary 
detail; (2) the plans allegedly did not adequately clarify the design of the north porch of 
the cabin; and (3) the patio on the south side of the cabin "might" have required what 
Brighton believed to be an excessive cut in the property. February 22, 1999 letter (Trial 
Exhibit No. 3) (attached to Addendum as Exhibit E). 
Ward's counsel responded on February 25, 1999, explaining that the claimed 
"deficiencies" were not deficiencies at all, but stating that Ward "believe[s] that these 
three issues can be resolved," and that Ward would submit revised plans to attempt to 
address Brighton's concerns. See February 25, 1999 letter from Douglas J. Parry to 
James S. Jardine (R. 1252-54). On March 2, 1999, Brighton's counsel acknowledged that 
the settlement discussion was merely a proposal, stating that "[i]n an effort to see if this 
matter can be settled prior to trial, I am writing to clarify our understanding of our 
discussions on a proposed settlement." March 2, 1999 letter from James S. Jardine to 
Douglas J. Parry (emphasis added) (R. 1256-58). See also Brighton's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (R. 1400) 
("Brighton agrees that the proposal stated in the March 2, 1999 letter was only a proposal, 
i.e., it was not accepted on that day."). 
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The October 28,1998 letter specifically provided that "any settlement must be 
fully and completely documented and incorporated in an order of the Court that includes 
all approved plans " October 28, 1998 letter at 2 (Trial Exhibit No. 2). Likewise, the 
March 2, 1999 letter from Brighton's counsel indicated that "it is essential that final 
plans, if approved, be included and incorporated into the Court's final order." March 2, 
1999 letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (R. 1258). 
On March 3, 1999, the parties informed the Court of the proposed settlement. The 
parties requested and obtained a trial date at the end of April 1999 in the event the 
settlement was not accomplished. March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:4, 25). The 
following excerpts from the record establish that a settlement had not yet been reached, 
and would only be reached on the satisfaction of actions that remained to be taken. 
MR. JARDINE: It, in fact, Your Honor, is a conditional settlement wefd 
like to read into the record. It's conditional because certain actions remain 
to be taken. March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:3, lines 17-19) (emphasis 
added). 
MR. JARDINE: We propose to state the agreement on the record and then 
to formalize it later in an order for the Court to sign, if the remaining issues 
and actions are satisfactorily resolved. And we would ask the Court to 
continue the trial date, and I think Mr. Parry will speak to that. WeVe 
agreed that we will review the contemplated plans to be submitted to us, 
within seven days of receiving them, and I think Mr. Parry will ask you 
about available trial dates within that time frame. Id at 3-4 (emphasis 
added). 
MR. JARDINE: There remains an issue outstanding that the future plans 
submitted to us will address, which is the location and design of the porch 
or front entrance proposed on the north side. Id at 5, lines 15-16 (emphasis 
added). 
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MR. JARDINE: " . . . if the issues raised in the letters of October 28, 1998, 
and February 22, 1999, and the noted ambiguities are addressed and 
resolved . . . [Brighton will not] disapprove the plans." Id. at 6, lines 11-15 
(emphasis added). 
MR. JARDINE: There are other issues to address in terms of the proposed 
settlement. A term of the proposed settlement is that Mr. Ward will 
withdraw all plans filed to date with the county . . . . Id. at 6, lines 16-19 
(emphasis added). 
MR. JARDINE: Next, with regard to Brighton Corporation's waterline 
easement, which comes across the property, the proposed resolution is that 
the claim of trespass and relocation would be dismissed, if everything else 
is resolved . . . Id. at 10, lines 20-23 (empnasis added). 
MR. JARDINE: I understand that if all of this is achieved and 
accomplished and finally resolved, that all other claims between the parties 
would be dismissed and that a final order would be entered with the Court, 
setting forth all of the terms of the settlement, attaching the plans, . . . . Id. 
at 13, lines 6-10 (emphasis added). 
MR. JARDINE: One of the issues is whether the road would be paved. It's 
our understanding that if this goes through, we would pave the road, at 
Brighton Corporation's expense. Id. at 15, lines 16-19 (emphasis added). 
MR. PARRY: My only other thing is the time for trial, if necessary. I'm 
hoping that you'll have two days sometime in late April or early May. Id. at 
17, lines 5-7. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk about that. Let me ask you this-when 
would you be aware of whether you might want those days? How soon? 
Id at 17, lines 10-12. 
THE COURT: Thank you each. All right, based then upon that stipulation, 
the Court will strike the trial date anticipating, hopefully, that the whole 
matter will be resolved upon this stipulation. The Court has continued a 
trial date, in anticipation that the matter will be resolved, however, to April 
29 and 30. if needed, for the trial. All right? Id. at 25, lines 1-7 (emphasis 
added). 
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Ward agreed to settle this matter on the condition that Brighton approve his plans 
in time for him to start construction in the 1999 building season. Affidavit of Greg Ward 
("Ward Aff") (R. 1365). See also March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:17-18) (Wardfs 
counsel requested a trial date before June 1999 so that Ward could build in 1999). Ward 
testified that he believed that the settlement was a conditional proposal. Trial Transcript, 
Vol. II (R. 1751:453). Ward also relied on Brighton's representations that a prior survey 
(the "Sneidman" survey) was accurate. See October 28, 1998 letter at 3. An updated 
survey conducted after March 3, 1999, revealed that the Sneidman survey was not 
accurate. See Updated Survey (Trial Exhibit No. 46). 
Ward subsequently submitted revised plans to Brighton in April 1999 (hereinafter 
the "April 1999 Plans"). Trial Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:59, lines 11-13; Trial 
Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:348). At Brighton's request, Ward supplemented those plans 
in June 1999 (hereinafter the "June 1999 Supplements").2 Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 
1750:61, lines 12-17). Ward's architect, Kimble Shaw, testified at trial that Brighton's 
counsel informed him that if he produced the supplemental drawings, the parties would 
then have a settlement. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:350-51). 
2At trial, Mary Barton referred to the April 1999 Plans as "Preliminary Plans" and 
the June 1999 Supplements as "Final Plans." Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:56). 
However, Kimble Shaw explained that the June 1999 plans were "supplementary 
drawings" with information organized in a different manner according to a specific 
request by Brighton. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:344-350). The two plans were 
meant to be read together. 
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Brighton refused to approve Ward's plans. See June 23, 1999 letter from James S. 
Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (Trial Exhibit No. 13). Ward determined that Brighton was 
not acting in good faith to reach a settlement and informed Brighton's counsel that there 
was no use in pursuing settlement discussions any further and that the parties should 
prepare for trial. See July 7, 1999 letter from Douglas J. Parry to James S. Jardine (Trial 
Exhibit No. 35; R. 1272). Brighton responded by filing a Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement. (R. 1197). On October 22, 1999, the Court granted Brighton's motion, 
ruling that the stipulation stated by counsel on the record on March 3, 1999, constituted a 
binding and enforceable contract and that the terms of the contract were stated in the 
March 3, 1999 hearing and the documents incorporated therein (i.e., the letters and the 
checklists). Nov. 3, 1999 Order (R. 1417-18). See also Feb. 3, 2000 Order (R. 1690-91). 
Prior to the March 3, 1999 hearing, the trial court had granted a motion for partial 
summary judgment in which the trial court ordered that Ward must compensate Brighton 
for all further costs , including attorney's fees, associated with any review of new plans 
submitted by Ward to Brighton. March, 3, 1999 Order (R. 1185-88). The payment of 
costs and attorney's fees as a condition of review is not mentioned in the proposed 
settlement. See Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:280-81) (James S. Jardine admits that 
the settlement "is silent" on the issue of attorney's fees). Nevertheless, after the March 3, 
1999 hearing, Brighton continued to claim that Ward must pay Brighton's costs and 
attorney's fees associated with Brighton's review of future plans. See, e.g. June 23, 199 
letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry at 5 (Trial Exhibit No. 13) ("Based on the 
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earlier order of partial summary judgment, Brighton will be submitting an invoice for 
costs incurred in plan review); July 28, 1999 letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. 
Parry (R. 1413; Trial Exhibit No. 36) (requesting payment of $5,446.50 in attorney's 
fees); October 11, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to James K. Tracy (Trial Exhibit No. 
37) (stating that Brighton will not review further plans until its past fees and costs are 
paid); October 26, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to James K. Tracy (Trial Exhibit No. 
38) (asking for payment of an additional $3,499.00 in fees). Ward did not understand or 
agree that payment of cost and attorney's fees was a part of the proposed conditional 
settlement. Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:457-58).3 
Ward understood that the proposed settlement incorporated by reference the terms of the 
October 28, 1998 letter and the February 22, 1999 letter and that Brighton would not 
approve his plans if he did not correct his plans as suggested by Brighton. Testimony of 
Gregory Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:495-96). 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in allowing Brighton to pave a private roadway 
across Ward's property 
Brighton's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement included a request that 
Brighton be allowed to pave the gravel roadway running across Ward's property. (R. 
1197-99). The trial court had found in 1994 that the purpose of the restrictive covenants, 
including the Property Use Agreement, was 
3Ward made clear that his reference to a "settlement agreement" at trial was in 
recognition of the trial court's ruling, and that he was not conceding that he believed the 
conditional proposed settlement was in reality a binding settlement agreement. (R. 1751: 
454). 
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to preserve the private nature of plaintiff s cabin and the rustic nature of the 
surrounding lands, including the Subject Property [and] to limit the 
intrusion of high traffic . . . from the Subject Property . . . . 
October 4, 1994 Order at If 8 (R. 312). 
Ward agreed that if the parties were able to settle this matter and Brighton 
approved his plans, Brighton could pave the gravel roadway. March 3, 1999 Transcript at 
15 (R. 1745:15) (Mr. Jardine stated that "[i]t's our understanding that if this goes through, 
we [Brighton] would pave the road."). On August 5, 1999, Brighton's counsel wrote to 
Ward's counsel as follows regarding pavement of the roadway: 
We also recognize that the Property Use Agreement refers to the roadway 
easement as a "gravel" roadway. Accordingly, we agree that until the issue 
is resolved, as a practical matter, Brighton can pave the road this year only 
with your client's agreement. 
August 5, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagan to Douglas J. Parry (attached as Exhibit B to 
Ward's Objection to Order Allowing Plaintiff to Pave Private Roadway) (R. 1360). 
A scheduling conference was held on September 8, 1999. At that time, Ward's 
counsel was not aware that Brighton had filed the Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement, with the accompanying request to pave the road across Ward's Property.4 
Affidavit of Douglas J. Parry (Exhibit H to Ward's Petition for Emergency Extraordinary 
Writ) ("Parry Aff") at ffif 10-12. At the scheduling conference, Brighton informed the 
court that it had filed the motion a few days earlier. The trial court granted the motion 
September 3, 1999, the date the motion was filed, was the Friday prior to the 
Labor Day weekend. Brighton served the motion by mail, and with there being no mail 
delivery on Labor Day, Ward's counsel did not receive the motion until after the 
scheduling conference on September 8, 1999. Parry Aff. at ^ 10, 12. 
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allowing pavement of the roadway over Ward's objection that he had no notice or an 
opportunity to be heard on the matter. Id. at f^f 11, 13; September 21, 1999 Order (R. 
1392-94). 
Ward sought an extraordinary writ from this Court to prevent pavement of the 
roadway on his land. However, Brighton paved the roadway before this Court could act 
on the petition. See October 18, 1999 Remand Motion Results, Case No. 990845 
(denying Petition for Extraordinary Writ because "issue raised is moot inasmuch as the 
road has already been constructed."). 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in granting Brighton's summary judgment motion 
a. Brighton's evidence. Brighton reviewed plans submitted by Ward on 
several occasions. On each occasion, Brighton disapproved the plans. Affidavit of Mary 
M. Barton ("Barton Aff") at f 2 (R. 871-73). Mary Barton stated in her affidavit that one 
consistent problem on each occasion was that the plans submitted by Ward "were 
ambiguous, making it impossible to determine with confidence whether the plans were 
compliant." Id at ^ 3. At the first hearing in this case in 1994, the trial court found that 
Ward's plans were intentionally ambiguous. Judge's Ruling, September 7, 1994 (R. 
1742:4). Mr. Ward continued to submit plans that Mary Barton deemed to be 
"incomplete and ambiguous, and that make only slight changes from versions already 
rejected." Barton Aff. at f 6. Brighton's costs for legal counsel, and other costs incident 
to its review of Mr. Ward's plans had exceeded $60,000." Id. at^| 5. 
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b. Ward's evidence. After the trial court upheld Brighton's rejection of 
Ward's plans on October 4, 1994, Ward subsequently submitted to Brighton revisions of 
those plans to Brighton on October 26, 1994 and March 9, 1995. (See July 13, 1995 
Hearing Exhibits Nos.l, 4). Ward's plans were filed with and approved by Salt Lake 
County as meeting all county building and zoning requirements. See July 13, 1995 
Hearing Exhibit 15. John J. Saunders, a certified plan reviewer, reviewed Ward's plans 
and determined that the plans were "clear and can be easily understood to 'the proposed 
placement, plans and design' per the warranty deed for plan approval." (July 13, 1995 
Hearing Exhibit 15, p. 6). Brighton did not approve Ward's plans. 
Thereafter, Ward submitted additional plans for approval to Brighton, namely, the 
Classic Plan, the Cottage Plan, and the Chalet Plan. The Cottage Plan and Chalet Plan 
were also submitted to and approved by Salt Lake County. See Certificate of Custodian 
of Records (Exhibit D to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment) 
(R. 921-22). The Chalet Plan was resubmitted to Salt Lake County in 1998 (the "Revised 
Chalet Plan") and approved once again by Salt Lake County. Certified Letter of Public 
Record (Exhibit E to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment) (R. 
921-22). Salt Lake County officials certified that Ward's plans met all applicable 
requirements of the Wasatch Canyon Master Plan, Wasatch Canyon Development 
Standards, the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ("FCOZ"), and all land use and 
zoning requirements of Salt Lake County. Certified Letter of Public Record (attached as 
Exhibit E to Ward's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment) (R. 921-22). 
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Kimble Shaw testified that he reviewed the Designer, Cottage, and Chalet Plans, 
and "in my opinion find them to be clear and unambiguous." Affidavit of Kimble Shaw 
at Tffl 5-6, 10 (attached as Exhibit J to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment) (R. 956-57). Shaw also testified that it is an "acceptable 
architectural practice for a licensed architect to design a structure and have a draftsmen 
draw the working drawings." Id. at f^ 11. Salt Lake County had determined that because 
FCOZ was enacted after a site plan for Ward's property had been approved, the property 
was not subject to FCOZ. See August 11, 19998 Certified Letter of Public Record from 
William A. Marsh, Salt Lake County Development Services Division (R. 924). 
Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred in refusing at trial to consider the latest set of 
plans submitted to Brighton by Ward 
On October 22, 1999, the trial court granted Brighton's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement and ordered that "the issue to be decided at trial on November 17, 
and 18, 1999, is whether the plans submitted by Ward after the hearing on March 3, 1999 
complied with the criteria stated in the March 3, 1999 stipulation and incorporated 
letters." November 3, 1999 Order (R. 1417-18 at ^ 3). After the March 3, 1999 
stipulation regarding the proposed settlement, Ward, through Kimble Shaw, submitted the 
April 1999 Plans and the June 1999 Supplements to Brighton for review. (R. 1751:348-
49). Brighton rejected the plans. See June 23, 1999 letter from James S. Jardine to 
Douglas J. Parry (Trial Exhibit No. 13). 
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After submitting the April 1999 Plans to Brighton, Ward received a memorandum 
from Brighton's architect, Neil Richardson, making comments on the plans. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1750:349); Trial Exhibit No. 5. Shaw was in the process of 
incorporating Richardson's comments into the April 1999 Plans when he was told to stop 
because Ward believed that Brighton was not acting in good faith and this matter could 
not be settled. Trial Transcript Vol. II (R. 1751:363-64). However, Shaw subsequently 
made the revisions requested by Richardson, as well as changes aimed at meeting 
Brighton's concerns expressed in its June 23, 1999 letter. These changes were included 
in the plans dated August 23, 1999. Trial Transcript Vol. II (R. 1751:366); Trial Exhibit 
No. 27). These plans were submitted to Brighton for review on October 6, 1999.5 See 
Trial Exhibit No. 29; Trial Transcript Vol. II (R. 1751:473). 1751:473-74). 
On October 11, 1999, Brighton informed Ward that it refused to review the plans 
submitted on October 6, 1999, because it wanted to wait until the trial court decided its 
pending Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and also because it would not review 
any additional plans unless Ward paid the costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, 
associated with Brighton's review of the plans submitted in April and June. See October 
11, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to Douglas J. Parry (Trial Exhibit No. 37) (requesting 
payment of $5,446.50 in attorney's fees). 
5These plans were dated August 23, 1999, but submitted on October 6, 1999. Page 
one of the plans is a Site Plan. The Site Plan was modified slightly on November 9, 1999, 
and delivered to Brighton on November 11, 1999. These plans were introduced as Trial 
Exhibit No. 27 and are referred to as the "October 1999 Plans." 
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On October 26,1999, after the trial court granted Brighton's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement, Brighton sent Ward a letter stating as follows: 
. . . we believe that the plans that will be litigated at trial are those Mr. Ward 
submitted on April 9, 1999 and resubmitted, with corrections, on or about 
June 16, 1999. Due to the upcoming trial date, we need clarification of this 
issue immediately. Please let us know before the end of the week if you are 
going to contend that any other set of plans will be litigated at trial. 
October 26, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to Douglas J. Parry (Trial Exhibit No. 30). 
On November 1, 1999, Ward's counsel informed Brighton that the latest set of 
plans submitted to Brighton on October 6, 1999 would be litigated at 
With regard to Scott's October 26, 1999 letter requesting clarification of 
which plans will be litigated at trial, it seems clear that the plans will be the 
latest plans submitted to you. Mr. Ward submitted plans to Brighton 
Corporation in accordance with the terms of the proposed settlement 
agreement. Mr. Ward made revisions to those plans in response to your 
objections and concerns. These revisions are contained in the plans that we 
delivered to you on October 6, 1999. If you eventually decide to review 
those plans and notify us of any items that you believe are still deficient, 
Mr. Ward reserves the right to try to correct these deficiencies prior to trial. 
November 1, 1999 letter from James K. Tracy to James S. Jardine (Trial Exhibit No. 39). 
Brighton continued to refuse to review the latest set of plans. At trial, Brighton 
argued that the only issue for trial should be whether the plans submitted in June 1999 
complied with the settlement agreement that was ruled to exist by the trial court. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:14-16). The Court ruled that it would not consider the 
October 1999 Plans because Brighton had not reviewed them. Id. at 1750:32-50; 
February 3, 2000 Order (R. 1690-91) (ruling that "Brighton correctly determined that the 
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plans submitted in October 1999 were not properly presented for review and did not 
review them. Accordingly, those plans were not considered during the trial."). 
Shaw stated that he did not regard the April, June, or October plans as "final 
plans." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:419). However, Shaw's statement that these 
were not "final" plans must be considered in tandem with his testimony that all of the 
information requested by Brighton was on the plans (R. 1751:350, lines 8-14). The plans 
were not "final" only in the sense that Shaw indicated that he was willing to work with 
Brighton on any changes that they might request. (R. 1751:344). Ward clarified this 
issue when he testified that "if Brighton Corporation would approved those plans, then 
they'd be final plans." (R. 1751:501). However, because Brighton did not approve the 
plans, Ward continued to make changes which were included in the October Plans. (R. 
1751:501-02). Ward submitted the October Plans "hoping to get a final review and 
approval from Brighton . . . in hope to settle and finally resolve this matter." (R. 
1751:474). 
Brighton refused to review the October 1999 Plans because Ward had not paid 
Brighton's attorney's fees for prior review of plans. See Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 
1751:285) (Court understood that Brighton refused to review October 1999 Plans because 
Ward had not paid for Brighton's prior review of the other plans. Mr. Jardine confirmed 
that "that's our position your Honor."). The trial court apparently agreed with this 
position, stating that Brighton "should not be required to incur more of those costs before 
some reimbursement is made back to them." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:290). 
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Issue 5: Whether the trial court erred in ruling at the trial of this matter that Brighton 
properly rejected Ward's plans 
At trial, Brighton claimed that it rejected Ward's plans because of deficiencies 
listed on Trial Exhibit No. 14. See Trial Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:74) (referring to 
Exhibit 14, Mary Barton testified that "Yes. That's what we decided that it did not 
comply with."). The evidence regarding the specific points claimed by Brighton to be 
deficient, along with the evidence presented by Ward that the plans were sufficient, is set 
forth below:6 
1. The drawings of the north main entrance. See Trial Exhibit No. 14, fflf 1, 7. 
a. Brighton's evidence. The October 28, 1998 and February 22, 1999 letters 
state that prior plans of the north main entrance to the cabin were not sufficiently detailed, 
requested contour lines and exact elevations, and "suggested" that the entrance be located 
on the east side or the west side of the cabin. Trial Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3. Mary Barton 
testified that the June 1999 Supplements submitted by Ward were not sufficiently detailed 
and that Brighton "didn't get a plan showing the front porch. (R. 1750:80). She further 
indicated that a dotted line that showed existing grade and a heavy black line showing the 
grade after construction of the porch were insufficient. (R. 1750:81; 100-01). Mary 
Barton wanted exterior elevation drawings that showed "how the cabin was built into the 
slope of the mountain." (R. 1750:101). 
6The items in Exhibit 14 are not restrictions found in the Special Warranty Deed. 
Consequently, if there is no settlement agreement between the parties, none of these 
requirements would have been at issue at the trial. 
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Mary Barton was concerned that the plans showed a retaining wall on the northeast 
side of the cabin, but there was "no retaining wall or no grading or anything shown to the 
north side." (R. 1750:82). However, she could tell that Ward intended to make a "deep 
cut" and that was the basis on which she concluded the plans were insufficient regarding 
the north porch. (R. 1750:83). Mary Barton relied on her architect, Neil Richardson, to 
determine the adequacy of the plans. (R. 1750:142). 
Richardson did not testify that the "heavy black line" was insufficient. Richardson 
testified that the retaining wall to the east of the porch was too close to the limit of 
disturbance line and that there were no dimensions called out on the wall. (R. 1750:168-
69). He also believed that there was not sufficient detail to determine what grading would 
be done over the waterline. (R. 1750:172-73) 
b. Ward's evidence.7 Kimble Shaw, Ward's architect, testified that the north 
porch was shown on three detailed drawings. First, the site plan (Trial Exhibit No. 17) 
showed "existing grades, grades that are being moved, and the existing grade before 
construction. This included a drawing which showed the "retaining wall that hold backs 
the earth." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:357). Second, the floor plan (Trial Exhibit 
No. 18) showed a "quarter-inch scale plan of the front entry." (R. 1751:357). Finally, the 
elevation drawings (Trial Exhibit No. 20) give an elevation view of the front entry porch 
and "call out" the retaining wall. (R. 1751:357). The June 1999 Supplements also 
7During trial, Brighton stipulated that Mr. Ward believed that he had complied 
with every requirement raised by Brighton at trial. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 
1751:482). 
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showed detailed information regarding the north porch. See Trial Exhibits No. 10 ("Site 
Sections"), No. 11 ("Floor Plans"), and No. 7 ("Elevations").8 
2. Ward's plans referred to easements as "new" and "proposed." Trial Exhibit No. 
14,12. 
a. Brighton's evidence. Ward had agreed that if the parties settled this 
matter, he would "agree that there is an 18-foot easement for the wateriine." Transcript 
of March 3, 1999 hearing at 10, lines 23-25 (Trial Exhibit No. 1). The October 28, 1999 
letter stated that "[t]he existence and present location of Brighton Corporation's wateriine 
and easement must be confirmed so there is no future dispute about it." October 28, 1999 
letter (Trial Exhibit No. 2). Ward's plans showed the 18-foot easement, but described it 
as a "new"and "proposed" easement. The words "new" and "proposed" on the plans 
"troubled" Mary Barton. Trial Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:85, 147). 
b. Ward's evidence. The plans show the easement that would be 
acknowledged by Ward once the parties settled this case. See Site Plans (Trial Exhibits 
Nos. 6, 17, and 27). In addition, Mary Barton admitted on cross-examination that the 
wateriine had previously been on top of the ground and had been buried and extended by 
Brighton from its original position. (Trial Transcript, Vol. 1 (R. 1750:142-43).9 
8As is discussed more fully below, Carl Eriksson was going to testify that Ward's 
drawings were "as clear and detailed as any plans he has seen." Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Reconsider Disallowance of Testimony of Carl Eriksson (R. 1537 at |^ 5). 
Mr. Eriksson was also going to testify that the grading was adequately shown on the 
plans. Id. Judge Young refused to allow Carl Eriksson to testify on behalf of Ward. 
9The Special Warranty Deed only allowed Brighton a "permanent wateriine 
(continued...) 
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3. Location of Ward's sewer line. Trial Exhibit No. 14, f 3. 
The October 28, 1998 letter requests that Ward run his sewer line "along the west 
end of his property." Trial Exhibit No. 2 at p.3. On the April 1999 Plans and the June 
1999 Supplements, Ward showed the sewer line running through the middle of the 
property where there was an existing road. See Trial Exhibit Nos. 6, 17. This was where 
the Solitude Improvement District contemplated that the sewer would run. See 
Testimony of William G. Lapsley, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751: 326-27). Mary 
Barton testified that this was a ground for rejecting the plans. (R. 1750:89). After the 
trial court ruled that the language in the October 28, 1998 letter was a binding settlement 
agreement, Ward revised the plans to show the sewer line running on the west side of the 
property. See Trial Exhibit No. 27; Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:479-80). 
4. South side patio's compliance with the Foothills Canyons Overlay Zone. Trial 
Exhibit No. 14, 1f 4. 
a. Brighton's evidence. The February 22, 1999 letter states that a retaining 
wall of more than six feet would violate the standards set out in the Foothills Canyons 
Overlay Zone ("FCOZ"). Trial Exhibit No. 3 at ^ 3. Brighton "suggested" that Ward 
reduce the size of the patio or step down the patio in compliance with FCOZ. IdL FCOZ 
provides that a retaining wall used to support steep slopes "shall not exceed six feet in 
height from the finished grade," except where the wall is terraced between two tiers of not 
9(...continued) 
easement as the same now exists," i.e., existed on July 3, 1991. The updated survey 
showed that not only was the waterline lowered and extended, it was also moved north. 
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more than four foot tiers. Trial Exhibit No. 15 (pertinent portions of FCOZ are attached 
to the Addendum as Exhibit N). Mary Barton testified that she believed the plans 
submitted by Ward contained a retaining wall on the southeast side of the cabin that was 
in excess of six feet high. Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:95-97). Her architect, Neil 
Richardson, testified that he was generally familiar with FCOZ (R. 1750:155), and that 
even with the proposed tiered system, the "corners of that wall exceed that step [i.e., 
allowable under the FCOZ requirements]." (R. 1750:164-65). 
b. Ward's evidence. By tiering the retaining wall with a planter box, the 
corners of the retaining wall were less than six feet and did not violate FCOZ. See, e.g.. 
Trial Exhibit No. 7. The step design of the retaining wall left a retaining wall height of 
about five and one-half feet at the end of the step. Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial 
Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:514-15). Architect Kimble Shaw also testified that by 
terracing the retaining wall with a "triangulated planner," the retaining wall satisfied 
FCOZ. Trial Transcript., Vol. II (R. 1751:378). Salt Lake County had approved the plan 
design as complying with all county requirements, including FCOZ. See Testimony of 
Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:515).10 
5. Updated survey and transparency of survey. Trial Exhibit No. 14, ^  8. 
a. Brighton's evidence. The October 28, 1998 letter requested that Ward 
include with his plans a copy of the original Francom survey and include a transparent 
copy of the Sneidman survey. Trial Exhibit No. 2, at p.5. On March 3, 1999, James S. 
10Carl Eriksson was also going to testify that the plans complied with FCOZ. 
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Jardine indicated that Ward would provide an updated survey addressing "in detail what 
are called 'areas of disturbance.'" March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:5). Mary Barton 
testified that she never received a transparency of the Sneidman survey. Trial Transcript, 
Vol. 1 (R. 1750:104). Richardson believed that the drawings did not accurately show 
existing conditions. Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:160). He noted that there were trees 
shown in the road that goes through the property. (R. 1750:161). In addition, a circular 
driveway was not shown on the survey. (R. 1750:162). Richardson asked that all trees 
with a three inch or greater diameter be shown on the survey. Trial Exhibit No. 5. 
b. Ward's evidence. Greg Ward testified that because of heavy snows in 
Brighton canyon, a surveyor was not able to conduct an updated survey until "mid-June" 
1999. Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:467). The 
survey was updated on June 19, 1999, and again on October 6, 1999, and submitted to 
Brighton. See Trial Exhibit No. 46. Ward also testified that he already given Brighton a 
copy of the requested transparency and that Brighton had never asked for another copy. 
Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:486-88). 
6. Correction of "support documents". Trial Exhibit No. 14, [^ 11. 
a. Brighton's evidence. Mary Barton saw copies of "support documents" that 
had been filed by Mr. Ward with Salt Lake County with a prior application for a building 
permit. Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:105). The October 28, 1998 letter states that 
Brighton wanted Ward to correct those support documents, and submit a copy to Brighton 
for approval. Trial Exhibit No. 2 at p.6. The letter does not state what was to be 
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corrected on the "support documents." Id. Barton testified at trial that she never received 
a corrected copy of the documents. Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:105). 
b. Ward's evidence. Ward testified that when his plans were approved by 
Brighton, he intended to withdraw all "support documents" from the county and that he 
would not submit support documents with his building permit application in the future. 
Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R: 1751:533-34). 
7. Submission of color board. Trial Exhibit No. 14, ^ | 12. 
a. Brighton's evidence. The October 28, 1998 letter requested a "color board 
for exterior finish." Trial Exhibit No. 2 at 6. Mary Barton testified that she did not 
receive a copy of this color board with the June 1999 Supplements. Trial Transcript, Vol. 
I (R. 1750:106). She later testified that she had received color boards, but thought that 
she received several different color boards. (R. 1750:131-32). 
b. Ward's evidence. Mary Barton admitted that she may have received the 
color board with a prior set of plans. (R. 1750:126-27). Ward testified that he had 
previously given Brighton the color chart admitted as Trial Exhibit 16 and a color board 
admitted as Trial Exhibit 56, and that Brighton had not indicated in its response to the 
April 1999 Plans or the June 1999 Supplements that another color board was required. 
Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:446-47, 489-90). 
8. Withdrawal of all prior plans from the county. Trial Exhibit No. 14, f 15. 
It was undisputed that Ward had not yet withdrawn any prior plans from Salt Lake 
County. Ward testified that he intended to withdraw such prior plans after Brighton had 
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approved his plans. Testimony of Gregory M. Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 
1751:533). Mary Barton agreed, testifying that Mr. Ward would withdraw his prior plans 
at the time he filed approved plans. Testimony of Mary Barton, Trial Transcript, Vol. I 
(R. 1750:117) (Q. "Just that the settlement agreement was that whatever plans were on 
file with the county that Mr. Ward had filed, he would withdraw at the time he file the 
Brighton approved plans?" A. "Yes."). 
Issue 6: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Ward's expert witness. 
Carl Eriksson, who was also a fact witness, to testify at trial 
Ward attempted to call Carl Eriksson to testify at the trial of this matter, both as an 
expert witness and a fact witness. There was no dispute as to Mr. Eriksson's 
qualifications as an expert. See Carl Eriksson Resume (Trial Exhibit No. 31). He had 
approximately 26 years of experience in engineering and reviewing building plans for 
compliance with building codes and zoning ordinances. (R. 1750:221). He had been 
employed by Salt Lake County for approximately 16 years, where he was responsible for 
plan review, including engineering and zoning issues. (R. 1750:219-20). 
Neil Richardson, who testified as to whether Ward's plans complied with FCOZ, 
stated that he was "generally familiar" with the zoning ordinance. Testimony of Neil 
Richardson, Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750: 155). On the other hand, Carl Eriksson 
testified that he was intimately familiar with FCOZ, and in fact, assisted in drafting those 
requirements and had been responsible to direct the implementation of their requirements 
since their inception. Testimony of Carl Eriksson, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751: 221-
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22). He had, in his career, personally inspected approximately 100 building plans for 
compliance with FCOZ. (R. 1751:223). 
Brighton's counsel conducted voir-dire of Mr. Eriksson, who testified that he had 
only reviewed "small parts" of the Transcript of the March 3, 1999 hearing, the October 
28, 1999 letter, the February 22, 1999 letter, and the checklists (Trial Exhibit Nos. 1-4). 
(R. 1750:223-34). Based on that fact, the trial court excluded Mr. Eriksson from 
testifying at the trial. 
In a motion to reconsider argued during the trial, Ward proffered that the 
anticipated testimony of Carl Eriksson would include the following: (1) Ward's plans 
submitted in April 1999 and October 1999 contained all the required components of a 
building plan; (2) Salt Lake County had already approved the design set forth in the April 
1999 and October 1999 building plans as complying with FCOZ; (3) it is impossible for 
the cabin in this case to be built at a main floor elevation of 116.83 feet and at the same 
time have the cabin "on-grade" on the west side. Building the cabin at a main floor 
elevation of 116.83 feet results in the cabin being below grade on the west side, which is 
not preferred; (4) the plaintiffs contention in paragraph 1 of Exhibit 14 that Mr. Ward has 
not provided detailed drawings of north main entrance is without merit. The drawings 
were as clear and detailed as any plans he had ever seen. The elevation drawings clearly 
show the existing grade and clearly show how the cabin relates to that existing grade; (5) 
Ward's grading/draining plan is more detailed than most plans submitted to the County; 
(6) the plaintiffs contention that the grading might effect their waterline was without 
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merit; (7) the patio on the south side of the cabin complies with FCOZ; and (8) the plans 
submitted by Mr. Ward in April 1999 and June 1999 are sufficiently detailed that the 
cabin could be build without any information other than what was included on the plans. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Disallowance of Testimony of Carl 
Eriksson (R. 1537-44). See also Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 232-271) (oral argument on 
motion to reconsider). 
Issue 7: Whether the trial court erred in denying Ward's application for 
determination that consent to build the cabin had been unreasonably 
withheld after the July 13, 1995 evidentiary hearing 
In October 1994 the trial court entered a preliminary injunction against Ward 
enjoining Ward from constructing a cabin on his property without the express approval of 
Brighton, but stated that ff[i]n the event that defendants submit new and different 
proposed plans to plaintiff, which plans are then disapproved, defendants may apply to 
this Court for a determination of whether approval has been unreasonably withheld." 
October 4, 1994 Order at If 20 (R. 315). 
As stated above, Ward subsequently submitted revised plans to Brighton for 
approval. Brighton refused to approve the plans and the trial court held a hearing on July 
13, 1995 to determine whether Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval of the plans. 
The evidence presented by Ward and Brighton at that hearing is set forth below. 
a. Brighton's evidence. The proposed design contained a second floor 
ceiling which could be converted to a loft. Affidavit of Neil W. Richardson at ^ 9(b) 
(July 13, 1995 Hearing Exhibit 16) (hereinafter "Richardson Aff."). The plans called for 
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a roof pitch of 8/12. According to Neil Richardson, the preferred Alpine design in Utah is 
to retain snow on the roof with a 3/12 pitch.1! Richardson Aff. at f 9(a). 
Neil Richardson stated that the elevations shown on the proposed plans and the 
model were different than a topographical map previously provided to him and the 
renderings were ambiguous in that either the main floor would be three to four feet or 
more above 8812f, and therefore significantly above grade on the west, or else the 
entrance on the north and windows on the east would be below grade, contrary to the 
renderings. Richardson Aff. at f 9(c). Finally, Richardson did not believe that the plans 
met the Wasatch Canyons Development Standards (the "Standards") because the design 
called for the main floor of the cabin to be above-grade and required excessive cuts that 
conflicted with the Standard's objectives. Richardson Aff. at ^ 10(b). 
b. Ward's evidence. Ward reviewed the trial court's October 4, 1994 order 
and made changes to his proposed plans in order to conform with that order. Testimony 
of Gregory M. Ward, Transcript of July 13, 1995 Hearing (R. 1753:20). Ward put the 
cabin on grade on the west side. (R. 1753:21). In addition, Ward completely eliminated 
the basement by putting the main floor on slab concrete. (R. 1753:21). The loft was also 
llIt should be noted that at trial, Neil Richardson contradicted his own testimony at 
the July 13, 1995, hearing by testifying that there is not a preferred alpine pitch design. 
Testimony of Neil Richardson, Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R: 1750:187) (testifying that there 
are two acceptable theories, one to hold snow on the roof and the other to allow it to slide 
off). Further, as Ward's counsel made clear at the hearing, Brighton raised the issue 
regarding the pitch of the roof for the first time at the hearing, having never before 
discussed this issue with Ward or his counsel. July 13, 1995 Transcript (R. 1753:75). 
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completely eliminated. (R. 1753:21). The attic was now designed so that it was 
incapable of holding live loads. (R. 1753:21). 
Ward changed the roof pitch of his cabin from 9/12 to 8/12. (R. 1753:21-22). The 
first floor on the proposed cabin was built back into the hill very similar to Mary Barton's 
cabin. (R. 1753:22-23). The plans were redrawn to ensure that each floor was below 
1,200 square feet. (R. 1753:23). 
The overall height of the cabin was reduced by around 10 or 11 feet from the 
original plans rejected in 1994. (R. 1753:24). The top of Ward's proposed cabin was 
three feet below the building grade of Mary Barton's cabin, and the proposed cabin was 
100 to 120 feet from Mary Barton's cabin. (R. 1753:26). From the east side-the side 
facing Mary Barton's cabin-the proposed cabin gave the appearance of being only one 
story and pushed into the hill. (R. 1753:40-41). 
William A. Marsh III, a Manager of Salt Lake County's Development Services 
Division, testified that "[t]he plans submitted by Gregory Ward, which have been 
approved, conform with the Wasatch Canyon Development's Standards as applied by the 
county in connection with this type of residential development." Affidavit of William A. 
Marsh III at ^ 7 (R. 457). See also July 13, 1995 Hearing Exhibit 15, p.3 (the plans met 
all county zoning requirements and were approved by Salt Lake County Planning and 
Zoning). Finally, John J. Saunders, a certified plan reviewer, stated that the plans were 
clear in their presentation and can be easily understood for an approval process regarding 
"the proposed placement, plans and design." (July 13, 1995 Hearing Exhibit 15, p.6). 
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Issue 8: Whether the trial court erred in not recusing Judge David S. Young for bias 
and prejudice and whether the Supreme Court should order that Judge 
David S. Young be recused from this action for bias and for denying Ward 
his due process rights throughout the proceedings below 
In 1996, while this case was pending, Judge David S. Young was engaged in a 
hotly contested retention election. Affidavit of Gregory M. Ward in Support of Motion 
Requesting Recusal and Reassignment at f 1(R. 659). Judge Young succeeded in his 
retention election by a very narrow margin, reported to be just "barely 50 percent" of the 
vote. Id at Tf 2 (R. 660). During the course of the retention election campaign, large 
display ads were published in local newspapers publicly soliciting votes in favor of Judge 
Young's retention. These ads were run on several dates in October and November 1996. 
Id. at ^ 3 (R. 660); see also Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Gregory M. Ward in Support of 
Motion Requesting Recusal and Reassignment (R. 671). 
The ad in the newspaper listed individuals who proclaimed their public support for 
Judge Young. Affidavit of Gregory M. Ward in Support of Motion Requesting Recusal 
and Reassignment, at f 4 (R. 660). The list of individuals included James S. Jardine, lead 
counsel for plaintiff, and approximately 25 attorneys from the law firm of Ray, Quinney 
& Nebeker, which represented plaintiff in this action. Id at TJ 6 (R. 660). 
As a defendant before Judge Young, Ward had a reasonable concern about Judge 
Young's ability to be completely impartial, knowing that plaintiff was represented by 
James S. Jardine and Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, who played such a high profile and 
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publicly advertised role in Judge Young!s closely contested retention election campaign 
while this case was pending. Id, at f^ 7 (R. 660). 
On May 16, 1997, before any hearings had been held in the case since the retention 
election, Ward filed a Motion Requesting Recusal and Reassignment. (R. 651-53). Judge 
Young refused to recuse himself and the matter was referred to Judge Leslie A. Lewis in 
accordance with Rule 63(b), who denied the motion. June 9, 1997 Court's Ruling (R. 
719). 
From very early in these proceedings, and especially after Ward sought Judge 
Young's recusal, Judge Young has exhibited unfairness, amounting to actual bias, in favor 
of Mary Barton and Brighton Corporation. For example, at the hearing on July 13, 1995, 
the court allowed opposing counsel to offer an uninterrupted opening statement. 
Transcript of July 13, 1995 Hearing (R. 1753:5-10). When counsel for Ward gave an 
opening statement, the court interrupted several times, challenging the proposed plans 
before any evidence regarding the plans had been presented. (R. 1753:11, 12, 13-14). 
Before Ward's counsel had even finished his opening statement, and before any evidence 
had been heard regarding all the changes that had been made to the plans, the court stated: 
"it strikes me that it isn't a good faith effort to try to redesign a cabin if you only make a 9 
foot difference." (R. 1753:12). Ward's counsel responded to each one of the court's 
challenging statements and the court finally stated: "Well, go ahead and present your 
evidence and I'll sit and hear it." (R. 1753:16). 
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Despite the fact that the very purpose of the July 13,1995 hearing was to 
determine whether Brighton was unreasonably withholding approval of Wardfs plans, the 
court stated at the end of the hearing that "[it] didn't know whether [plaintiff] was being 
picky about the kinds of things that [plaintiff was] expecting [Ward] to do in [his] cabin 
or to build in [his] cabin." (R. 1753:71). Nevertheless, the court proceeded to rule that 
Ward's plans did not adequately comply with the requirements of the Special Warranty 
Deed, but failed to state how the plans failed to comply. (R. 1753:76). 
Ward submitted a number of revised plans as set forth above, always complying 
with the "two floors" and "1,200 square feet" requirements. Nevertheless, Brighton 
Corporation refused to approve the plans. In order to attempt to salvage the 1996 
building season, Ward requested an expedited hearing an another motion for a 
determination by the court whether Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval. (R. 
468-70). The court refused to hear Ward's motion. June 5, 1996 Minute Entry (R. 611). 
On December 22, 1998, James Jardine, on behalf of plaintiff, filed the summary 
judgment discussed above. On December 23, 1998, the court held a scheduling 
conference. At that time, Ward's counsel had not had an opportunity to even review the 
summary judgment motion. Affidavit of Douglas J. Parry f^ 3 (Exhibit H to Gregory M. 
Ward's Petition for Emergency Extraordinary Writ). At the conclusion of the scheduling 
conference, Brighton's counsel informed Judge Young of the summary judgment motion. 
Judge Young stated that he was inclined to grant the motion before he had an opportunity 
to review the motion and before Ward had an opportunity to respond to the motion. IdL 
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Ward's counsel objected on the ground that Ward had not had an opportunity to respond, 
and Judge Young said that Ward could go ahead and file an opposition, but the court was 
nevertheless inclined to grant the motion, which it did. Parry Aff. at ^ 4. 
As set forth above in detail in the Statement of Facts relating to Issue No. 2 
(relating to the pavement of the road), on September 8, 1999, Judge Young ruled that 
Brighton could pave the roadway over Ward's Property without giving Ward any notice 
or a fair opportunity to be heard. Parry Aff. at f^lf 10, 12. 
Judge Young's biased rulings continued at trial. As detailed above, Judge Young 
refused to consider the October 1999 Plans because Brighton had not reviewed them, 
even though his own ruling, issued October 22, 1999, stated that the issue for trial would 
be whether the plans submitted by Ward after March 3, 1999 complied with the 
settlement agreement. Judge Young allowed Brighton' witness, Neil Richardson, who 
stated that he was "generally familiar" with the zoning ordinance, to testify at trial 
regarding whether Ward's plans complied with FCOZ, but would not allow Ward's 
expert, Carl Eriksson, to rebut this testimony, even though Eriksson was more familiar 
with the statute and its application than Neil Richardson. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Brighton has unreasonably refused to approve Ward's plans to build a cabin on his 
Property for the last six years, despite the fact that Ward's plans have met the 
requirements in the Special Warranty Deed that the cabin have only two floors of no more 
than 1,200 square feet per floor . The trial court has facilitated and upheld Brighton's 
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refusal to approve plans even though Ward has complied with the restrictive covenants 
and submitted plans that any reasonable person would approve (and which in fact were 
approved by Salt Lake County). 
The threshold issue in this case is whether the parties entered into a binding 
settlement agreement on March 3, 1999. This issue will determine what standard should 
be applied in reviewing Ward's plans. The record clearly establishes that the parties 
informed the trial court of a proposed settlement, but that the settlement never was 
accomplished. The proposal contemplated that Ward would resubmit plans which 
addressed issues raised by Brighton in an October 28, 1998 letter and a February 22, 1999 
letter. The parties agreed that any settlement must include "approved plans." Therefore, 
there could not be any settlement without plan approval and it is undisputed that Brighton 
never approved any plans. The March 3, 1999 transcript is replete with references to the 
proposed nature of the settlement. The fact that the trial court gave the parties a trial date 
at the end of April 1999 is further evidence that the case was not settled, but rather, that 
the parties were working towards a settlement. The trial court erred in ruling that the 
parties had entered into an enforceable contract and settlement agreement, the terms of 
which were not specifically identified, but were ruled to be contained in the October 1998 
letter, the February 22, 1999 letter, the March 3, 1999 transcript, and two checklists. 
Such an agreement lacks sufficient definiteness to be enforced. In addition, the conduct 
of the parties after March 3, 1999, establishes that the parties did not reach a meeting of 
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the minds on key issues, including, but not limited to, the payment of attorney's fees and 
final approval of the plans. 
The trial court erred in ruling on a summary judgment motion that (1) that Greg 
Ward must compensate Brighton for all costs, including attorney's fees, associated with 
any future review by Brighton of any new plans submitted by Ward; (2) that it was 
reasonable for Brighton to require a licensed architect to sign any plans for the cabin; and 
(3) that it was reasonable for Brighton to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone 
("FCOZ") ordinance of Salt Lake County in reviewing plans submitted by Ward. There 
were no such requirements in the operative Special Warranty Deed. In addition, the basis 
for Brighton's motion for summary judgment was Brighton's allegation that it was 
burdened by Ward's repeated submission of ambiguous plans. Ward controverted the 
assertion that the plans were ambiguous and therefore, the issue was not properly decided 
on summary judgment. The requirement to pay attorney's fees also violated the well-
accepted rule that attorney's fees can be awarded only by statute or by contract. 
Further, even if Brighton were entitled to attorney's fees based on the trial court's 
erroneous summary judgment order, if the parties actually entered into a settlement 
agreement as ruled by the trial court, Brighton compromised any right to attorney's fees 
as a part of that settlement. 
As a part of Brighton's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, Brighton 
requested that the trial court allow it to pave a roadway across Ward's property. The 
Property Use Agreement prohibited the paving of the road. The trial court violated 
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Ward's due process rights by granting this motion before Ward's counsel had received 
the motion or had a fair opportunity to oppose the motion. 
After March 3, 1999, Ward submitted plans to Brighton on April 9, 1999, June 16, 
1999, and October 6, 1999. The October 6, 1999 plans incorporated specific changes 
requested by Brighton after it reviewed the April and June plans. Brighton wrongfully 
refused to review the October 6, 1999 plans, demanding payment of its attorney's fees for 
reviewing the April and June plans before it would review additional plans. On October 
22, 1999, the trial court held that a settlement existed and that the issue at trial would be 
whether the plans submitted by Ward to Brighton after March 3, 1999 complied with the 
settlement. Thereafter, Brighton continued to refuse to review the October 6, 1999 plans. 
The trial court ruled that Ward could not submit evidence of the October 6, 1999 
plans at trial because Brighton had not reviewed the plans. Consequently, the entire trial 
on November 17-19, 1999, was on the issue of whether the earlier plans were sufficient, 
even though both parties acknowledged that the October 6, 1999 plans were the latest 
plans. The trial court violated its own order by refusing to consider the latest set of plans 
submitted by Ward to Brighton. 
Additionally, the trial court erred in not allowing Ward's expert, Carl Eriksson, to 
testify that Ward's plans were clear, unambiguous, detailed, and complied with every 
requirement raised by Brighton at trial. The trial court also erred in ruling that Ward's 
plans were properly rejected by Brighton. Brighton raised eight objections to Ward's 
plans, each of which was adequately rebutted by Ward. 
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In 1995 Ward had submitted plans to Brighton which only had two floors and less 
than 1,200 square feet per floor. Brighton wrongfully rejected those plans. The court 
erred in not ruling that Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval of the 1995 plans. 
Finally, the trial court erred in refusing to recuse Judge Young after James Jardine 
played a prominent and advertised role in Judge Young's 1996 retention election 
campaign. Judge Young has consistently prejudged this case and demonstrated actual 
bias against Ward, all in violation of Ward's due process rights to fair and unbiased 
hearings. The Supreme Court should order that Judge Young be recused from this case 
and that this case be reassigned to another district court judge. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Ward's ability to build on his Property is governed by the restrictive covenants in 
the Special Warranty Deed, which require that Ward's cabin be limited to two floors with 
no more than 1,200 square feet per floor, and provide that Brighton has the right to review 
and approve Ward's plans, which approval "shall be timely and shall not be unreasonably 
withheld." Special Warranty Deed (Trial Exhibit No. 44). 
This Court has explained that "restrictive covenants are not favored in the law and 
are strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property." St. Benedict's 
Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194. 198 (Utah 1991) "Generally, 
express restrictive covenants are upheld only 'where they are necessary for the protection 
of the business for the benefit of which the covenant was made and no greater restraint is 
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imposed than is reasonably necessary to secure such protection.'" Id. (quoting Allen v. 
Rose Park Pharmacy. 237 P.2d 823, 826 (1951)). It is axiomatic that where a restrictive 
covenant gives the grantor the right to restrict the free use of property by approving or 
disapproving construction plans, that right must be exercised reasonably and in good 
faith. See, e ^ , Norris v. Phillips. 626 P.2d 717, 719 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); McNamee v. 
Bishop Trust Co.. 616 P.2d 205, 208 (Hawaii 1980). These limitations are intended to 
prevent the exercise of subjective, and unfettered discretion in disapproving plans. In this 
case, since 1995 the trial court has refused to constrain Brighton's discretion to that of an 
objectively reasonably person, and instead allowed Brighton to assert any subjective 
ground for disapproving Ward's plans, regardless of whether those grounds were 
supported by the evidence or were reasonable. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE CONDITIONAL 
PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CONSTITUTED A BINDING AND ENFORCEABLE 
CONTRACT AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
"Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to general contract 
actions." Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). A "trial court has the 
power to enter a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement if it is an enforceable 
contract." Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). The proposed conditional settlement agreement in this case is not an 
enforceable contract for the following three reasons: (1) the proposed agreement 
constituted preliminary negotiations to which further manifestations of assent were 
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required; (2) there were never any plans approved, which was an essential condition of 
any settlement; and (3) the proposed agreement lacked sufficient definiteness to be 
enforced and the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds on essential terms of the 
proposed agreement. 
1. The proposed agreement constituted preliminary negotiations to which 
further manifestations of assent were required. 
Preliminary negotiations do not constitute a binding contract. Sadder, 897 P.2d at 
1221. This Court has explained, with regard to preliminary negotiations, as follows: 
A manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the 
person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person 
making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further 
manifestation of assent. 
Sadder, 897 P.2d at 1221 (quoting Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 26 (1981)). 
In this case, both parties made it clear that a settlement was conditioned on a 
"further manifestation of assent." Ward would further manifest his assent by submitting 
new plans to Brighton. Brighton would further manifest its assent to settlement by 
approving those plans. Brighton never approved the plans, i.e., never manifested its 
assent to the settlement. Consequently, no enforceable agreement was reached. 
Although the parties exchanged correspondence regarding a proposed settlement 
for a number of months, it is clear that as of March 2, 1999, the parties had not reached 
any agreement. On that day, counsel for Brighton wrote to counsel for Ward, stating as 
follows: "In an effort to see if this matter can be settled prior to trial, I am writing to 
clarify our understanding of our discussions on a proposed settlement." March 2, 1999 
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letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit E 
to Brighton's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement) (R. 
1256-58). See also Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement (R. 1400) ("Brighton agrees that the proposal stated in the March 2, 1999 
letter was only a proposal, i.e., it was not accepted on that day."). 
Nor had any final settlement agreement been reached on March 3, 1999, when the 
parties informed the Court of their settlement discussions. As set forth above in the 
Statement of Facts, it is abundantly evident from the record in this case that the proposed 
settlement was a conditional settlement. As explained by Brighton's counsel at the outset 
of the March 3, 1999 hearing, "It, in fact, Your Honor, is a conditional settlement wefd 
like to read into the record. It's conditional because certain actions remain to be taken." 
March 3, 1999 Transcript at 3, lines 17-19 (R. 1745:3). Thereafter, as set forth in the 
Statement of Facts above, Brighton's counsel makes at least seven more references to the 
conditional nature of the proposal. 
The fact that the parties asked for, and were granted, a trial date immediately after 
reading into the record the proposed agreement is compelling evidence that no final and 
binding settlement had yet been reached. If a settlement had been agreed upon, there 
would be no need for a trial date. In that event, the Court would have vacated the trial 
date rather than continue the trial date. See, e.g., Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending 
Systems. Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (cancellation of a trial setting was 
"an act consistent with a settlement having been reached."); Zions First National Bank v. 
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Barbara Jensen Interiors. Inc., 781 P.2d 478,479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("The court also 
noted that, consistent with a settlement having been reached, the Jensen's depositions 
were cancelled and the trial date stricken by Zion."). 
The parties did nothing more than present to the trial court what the proposal was 
for resolving this matter. The record is clear that the proposal was conditional and that 
further manifestations of assent were required from both Ward, through the submittal of 
revised plans, and from Brighton, through the approval of those plans. 
2. There were never any plans approved, which was an essential condition of the 
proposed settlement. 
There could not be any settlement until Brighton approved Ward's plans. The 
October 28, 1998 letter, which the trial court held to be a part of the settlement, 
specifically provided that "any settlement must be fully and completely documented and 
incorporated in an order of the Court that includes all approved plans . . . . " October 28, 
1998 letter at 2 (Trial Exhibit No. 2) (emphasis added). On March 2, 1999, Brighton 
confirmed that an essential term of the proposed settlement was that "final plans, if 
approved, be included and incorporated into the Court's final order." See March 2, 1999 
letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (R. 1258). Likewise, on March 3, 1999, 
James S. Jardine told the trial court that "if all of this is achieved and accomplished and 
finally resolved . . . that a final order would be entered with the Court, setting forth all of 
the terms of the settlement [and] attaching the plans . . . ." March 3, 1999 Transcript at 13 
(R. 1745:13). 
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The parties contemplated that there would not be a settlement unless and until 
Brighton approved Ward's plans. It was undisputed that Brighton never approved Ward's 
plans, and therefore, there was no settlement between the parties. 
3. The proposed agreement was ambiguous and lacked sufficient defmiteness to 
be enforced and the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds on essential 
terms of the agreement 
It is well-accepted that "a contract will not be specifically enforced unless the 
obligations of the parties are 'set forth with sufficient defmiteness that it can be 
performed." Plateau Mining Co. v. The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 
P.2d 720, 726 (Utah 1990). See also Oberhanslv v. Earle. 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 
1977) ("It is a basic principle of contract law there can be no contract without a meeting 
of the minds of the parties which must be spelled out either expressly or impliedly with 
sufficient defmiteness to allow enforcement."); Sadder, 897 P.2d at 1220 ("Under the 
principles of basic contract law, a contract is not formed unless there is a meeting of the 
minds." ). 
In determining whether a contract has been reached between two parties, the court 
may examine a number of factors, including "the extent to which express agreement has 
been reached on all the terms to be included," and "whether it has few or many details." 
Sadder, 897 P.2d at 1221. This case involves "many details" which were never reduced 
to a writing and upon which Brighton and Ward did not reach a meeting of the minds. 
In this case, the trial court held that the terms of the settlement agreement were 
contained in the seven page October 28, 1998 letter, the three page February 22, 1999 
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letter, and the twenty-five page March 3, 1999 transcript. The two letters could contain as 
man\ as fifty to seventy separate requirements depending on how the letters are 
interpreted. The letters contain language such as Brighton "suggests" Ward do certain 
things or Ward "should" do certain things, making it unclear whether these suggestions 
are terms of a settlement. In fact, on March 2, 1999, Brighton informed Ward that "the 
February 22, 1999 letter does not set out terms of settlement but does list three areas of 
deficiency." March 2, 1999 letter from James S. Jardine to Douglas J. Parry (R. 1400). 
The letters include extremely broad and ambiguous language such as requests for 
more "detailed drawings" and statements that the plans are "incomplete" or do not 
"adequately clarify" certain items. Judge Young himself recognized that the agreement 
was not very specific, stating that "I was uncomfortable with the specificity of it." Trial 
Transcript, Vol. II (R. 240) (Nevertheless, he concluded that it was "sufficiently specific 
that there could be a common understanding."). Id. 
The fact that the parties have disagreed on the exact terms of the settlement is 
evidence that the agreement was too vague and ambiguous to be enforced. Did the 
"settlement" require Ward to simply comply with FCOZ (by using a tiered retaining wall 
system for example), or was he required to use a stepped patio? Did the "settlement" 
simply require Ward to provide "more" detail on the front porch, or was he actually 
prohibited from using a "heavy black line" to show grading? Did the settlement require 
Ward to produce a detailed survey of the entire Property, or just the areas of disturbance? 
Did the "settlement" require the cabin to be "on grade on the west," or sited at a main 
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level of 116.83 feet or both? (Carl Eriksson indicated that siting the cabin at 116.83 
would place the cabin below grade). Did the "settlement" require Ward to pay Brighton's 
attorney's fees. Was allowing Ward to build in the 1999 season a condition of the 
settlement? These are just a few examples of the areas of disagreement between the 
parties that resulted from the vague and ambiguous nature of the letters which were 
determined by the trial court to constitute a binding contract. 
The failure of the parties to reach a meeting of minds is perhaps best illustrated by 
the issue of the payment of attorney's fees. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, 
Brighton maintains that after the proposed settlement, Ward was still required to pay 
Brighton's costs of review of plans. See, e.g.. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:285). 
Ward, on the other hand, believed that to the extent Brighton had the right to require him 
to pay its fees as a condition of review, it compromised that right in the settlement that the 
trial court ruled to exist. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:477-78). The parties have a 
fundamental disagreement on this and other essential terms of the agreement 
As a further example, Ward maintains that an essential part of any agreement was 
that Brighton would approve his plans in time to allow Ward to build in 1999 building 
season. After Brighton delayed approval of the plans, building in the 1999 season 
became impossible, thus frustrating any purpose of the settlement and further establishing 
a failure of conditions precedent. See Affidavit of Gregory M. Ward (R. 1365). 
The parties contemplated that if plans were approved, those plans would be 
attached to an order of the court "setting forth all the terms of the settlement." Transcript 
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of March 3, 1999 hearing (R. 1745:13). This was never done. The terms of the 
settlement were never agreed upon and the agreement ruled to exist by the trial court 
lacks sufficient definiteness to be an enforceable agreement. As Mr. Jardine stated on 
the record, this matter would be resolved "if this goes through." (R. 1745:15). It didn't 
"go through." There were no approved plans, no definite terms agreed upon, no meeting 
of the minds, and no settlement. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING BRIGHTON'S MOTION TO PAVE 
THE PRIVATE ROADWAY ACROSS WARD'S PROPERTY WITHOUT GRANTING 
WARD NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD 
Brighton's request to pave the private roadway across Ward's property was based 
on its argument that the parties had a binding settlement agreement in which Ward agreed 
that the road could be paved. As set forth above, the settlement was a proposal and there 
would not be any settlement until Brighton approved Ward's plans. Perhaps nowhere is 
this clearer than on the point regarding the pavement of the roadway, where Brighton's 
counsel stated on March 3, 1999, that "one of the issues is whether the road would be 
paved. It's our understanding that if this goes through, we would pave the road, at 
Brighton Corporation's expense. " March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 1745:15) (emphasis 
added). On August 5, 1999, Brighton's counsel wrote to Ward's counsel as follows 
regarding pavement of the roadway: 
We also recognize that the Property Use Agreement refers to the roadway 
easement as a "gravel" roadway. Accordingly, we agree that until the issue 
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is resolved, as a practical matter, Brighton can pave the road this year only 
with your client's agreement. 
August 5, 1999 letter from Scott A. Hagen to Douglas J. Parry (attached as Exhibit B to 
Ward's Objection to Order Allowing Plaintiff to Pave Private Roadway) (R. 1360). 
Thus, in August 1999, Brighton itself understood that it could not pave the 
roadway without Ward's permission, belying its later argument that there was a binding 
settlement as of March 1999, that gave it the right to pave the roadway. 
The trial court granted Brighton's motion to pave the road without giving Ward 
any notice or opportunity to be heard, and in direct contravention of the Property Use 
Agreement, thus depriving the defendant of an important property right.12 The United 
States and Utah Constitutions provide that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV. See also Utah Const. 
Art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law."). 
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that due process requires, among other 
things, inquiry into the merits of the question presented; notice of the purpose of the 
inquiry; opportunity to appear in person or by counsel; and fair opportunity to be heard. 
12The trial court's order allowing pavement of the road is even more astonishing in 
light of the fact that the court had previously found that the purpose of the restrictive 
covenants was to preserve the "rustic nature of the surrounding lands, including the 
Subject Property" and to "limit the intrusion of high traffic." October 4, 1994 Order at If 
8(R. 312). 
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In re: L.G.W.. 638 P.2d 527, 528 (Utah 1981). See also Simon v. Craft. 21 S.Ct. 836, 839 
(1901) ("[t]he essential elements of due process of law are notice and opportunity to 
defend."). This Court has further explained that procedural due process requires "notice 
and opportunity to be heard, which must be observed in order to have a valid proceeding 
affecting life, liberty, or property." Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 
199, 204 (Utah 1984). In addition, "where notice is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a 
party of the nature of the proceedings against him or not given sufficiently in advance of 
the proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived of due process." Nelson v. 
Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). 
The Judicial Council and the Supreme Court adopted rules in the Code of Judicial 
Administration designed to ensure that parties are given due process of law. One such 
rule is found in Rule 4-501, which provides that a party has ten days to oppose a motion. 
Rule 4-501(1 )(B), Rules of Judicial Administration. In this case, Ward had absolutely no 
notice and no opportunity to be heard with regard to the plaintiffs motion to pave the 
roadway. Not only was the trial court's granting of the motion error as explained above 
in Point I (based on the lack of a binding settlement agreement), such action by the trial 
court was a clear violation of Ward's due process rights. The trial court's order should be 
reversed and Brighton ordered to remove the pavement from Ward's Property and restore 
Ward's Property to its original condition. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF BRIGHTON REGARDING PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, HAVING A 
LICENSED ARCHITECT SIGN PLANS, AND APPLYING FCOZ TO THE PLANS 
The trial court erred in granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment 
for two reasons: (1) there were disputed facts regarding the factual basis for the motion; 
and (2) there is no legal basis for the court to award attorney's fees to Brighton, require 
the plans to be signed by a licensed architect, or allow Brighton to apply FCOZ in 
examining the plans. 
A court deciding a case on summary judgment does not resolve factual issues. 
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). "The party 
moving for summary judgment must establish a right to judgment based on the applicable 
law as applied to an undisputed material issue of fact." Lamb v. B & B Amusements 
Corp.. 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993). The trial court must assess those facts and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from those facts "in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment." Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
The trial court failed to apply these principles when it considered and granted 
Brighton's partial summary judgment motion. Brighton's argument in favor of its 
summary judgment motion was based on Brighton's factual assertion that Ward had 
repeatedly submitted "ambiguous" plans that made it difficult for Brighton to determine 
whether the plans were adequate and created expense for Brighton. See Affidavit of 
Mary M. Barton at f^ 3 (R. 871-73). Brighton therefore sought to have the court impose 
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upon Ward the cost of any review of further plans and require a licensed architect to sign 
any plans as a condition of plaintiff s reviewing the plans (an additional unnecessary 
expense to Ward). 
However, Brighton's assertion that the plans submitted by Ward were ambiguous 
was controverted by the affidavit of a licensed architect, who found the plans "clear and 
unambiguous." Affidavit of Kimble Shaw at fflf 5-6, 10 (attached as Exhibit J to 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment) (R. 956). Shaw further 
testified that Ward's plans "qualify for any reasonable plan approval process including the 
approval process of Salt Lake County required for obtaining a building permit." Id. at ^ | 
7. Additionally, a certified plan reviewer reviewed Ward's plans and determined that the 
plans were "clear and can be easily understood [as] to 'the proposed placement, plans and 
design'". (Letter from John J. Saunders, July 13, 1995 Hearing Exhibit 15, p.6). The sole 
factual basis for Brighton's summary judgment-that Ward's plans were ambiguous—was 
clearly a disputed issue of fact that precluded summary judgment. 
Further, there is no legal basis for the relief requested in the summary judgment 
motion. The rights and obligations of the parties were clearly spelled out in the Special 
Warranty Deed. As stated by this Court, "[a] court will no t . . . make a better contract for 
the parties than they have made for themselves." Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco. Ltd.. 618 
P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). 
None of the requirements Brighton sought to impose on Ward—payment of fees, 
use of a licensed architect, or being subjected to FCOZ-are contained in the Special 
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Warranty Deed. With regard to FCOZ, Salt Lake County had determined that Ward's 
Property was exempt from the ordinance. See August 11, 1998 Certified Letter of Public 
Record (R. 924) 
In addition, "Utah follows the 'American rule' with regard to awards of attorney 
fees. This general rule requires each party to bear his or her own attorney's fees in the 
absence of a statute or enforceable contractual provision to the contrary." Cobabe v. 
Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 835 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). There was no legal basis for the 
court to allow Brighton an award of fees to review plans submitted to it by Ward. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AT TRIAL TO CONSIDER THE 
LATEST SET OF PLANS SUBMITTED TO BRIGHTON BY WARD 
On October 22, 1999, the trial court ordered that the parties had entered into an 
enforceable settlement agreement and that the issue to be decided at trial was "whether 
the plans submitted by Ward after the hearing on March 3, 1999 complied with the 
criteria stated in the March 3, 1999 stipulation and incorporated letters." November 3, 
1999 Order at U 3 (R. 1417-18). Ward submitted plans in April 1999, supplemented those 
plans in June 1999, and made further revisions requested by Brighton in August 1999, 
which were submitted to Brighton for review on October 6, 1999. 
Ward submitted the October 1999 Plans "hoping to get a final review and approval 
from Brighton . . . in hope to settle and finally resolve this matter." (R. 1751:474). 
Ward's counsel pleaded with Brighton to review the October plans, which contained 
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revisions that had been requested by Brighton. See, e.g.. November 1, 1999 letter from 
James K. Tracy to James S. Jardine (Trial Exhibit No. 39). Brighton refused to review 
the plans and insisted that the trial be on the earlier plans, even though the October Plans 
addressed many of the concerns raised by Brighton regarding the June 1999 Supplements. 
According to the plain terms of the trial court's order setting forth the issue to be 
tried (which order was drafted by Brighton), the trial should have been on whether the 
October Plans submitted by Ward (the latest plans) complied with the settlement that the 
trial court had ruled on October 22, 1999, existed between the parties. 
The trial court ruled that the October Plans "were not properly presented for 
review." February 3, 2000 Order at If 2 (R. 1691). The trial court felt that the October 
Plans were untimely. At the end of trial, the trial court stated that "all those plans did for 
this trial [i.e., the October 1999 Plans] [was to] create some emotional appeal, that you 
we're still trying; but it's too late." Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill (R. 1752:577). 
Any claim by Brighton and the ruling by the trial court that the October 1999 Plans 
were untimely is without merit. There were no deadlines for submitting plans in the 
court's November 3, 1999, Order. The trial court did not even establish the issue to be 
decided at trial until October 22, 1999, over two weeks after Ward had submitted the 
October 1999 Plans to Brighton for review. It was clear that the real reason Brighton 
refused to review the plans was not the "timeliness" of the plans, but rather, because 
Brighton was insisting on payment of its attorney's fees from prior reviews as a condition 
of review. As explained above, even if the trial court had been correct in holding that the 
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parties had entered into a settlement, payment of attorney's fees was not a term of the 
settlement and it was improper for Brighton to refuse to review the plans on this basis.L> 
The trial court's refusal to consider the October 1999 Plans was contrary to the 
court's order that the trial would be on the plans submitted by Ward after March 3, 1999. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AT THE TRIAL OF THIS MATTER THAT 
BRIGHTON PROPERLY REJECTED WARD'S PLANS 
A trial court has a duty to make findings of fact. "The ultimate test of the 
adequacy of a trial judge's findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and 
pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision." Kunzlerv. O'Dell 855 P.2d 270, 
275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "The court's findings may be written separately or 'gleaned 
from the transcript, the opinion or the memorandum decision.'" Id In this case, the trial 
court failed to make specific findings of fact. Judge Young stated at the conclusion of 
trial as follows: 
So, I told you this was a thumbs-up thumbs-down kind of trial and I find 
thumbs down, that the defendant did not comply, so that's the basic finding 
that I'm making here. I'm not going to make findings about that." 
Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill (R. 1752:598, lines 7-11. 
"Unless the record 'clearly and uncontrovertedly supports]' the trial court's 
decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for more 
13In fact, Brighton's counsel stated on March 3, 1999, that the proposed settlement 
would resolve "all other claims" between the parties. March 3, 1999 Transcript (R. 
1745:10). Issues regarding attorney's fees are "claims" that would have been resolved. 
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detailed findings by the trial court." Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). However, it would serve no purpose to remand this case for additional 
findings on the April and June 1999 Plans. Because the trial court erred in not 
considering the latest set of plans, any new trial would have to examine a different set of 
plans in any event. Further, there are findings that can be "gleaned" from the record upon 
which this Court can determine that the plans should have been approved. 
1. The "finality" of Ward's plans. It is clear that the trial court believed that Ward 
had submitted plans that were not "final." It appears that the trial court felt it could rule 
that the plans were properly rejected on this basis alone. See, e.g. Trial Transcript, Vol. 
Ill (R. 1752:594) ("Your clients are in the position now where they have acknowledged 
not having filed final plans, and I have no choice in this case but ruling as I will. I cannot 
find that there has been compliance by the defendant with the requirements of the 
settlement agreement.").14 
The fundamental problem with Brighton's argument and Judge Young's "finding" 
regarding final plans is that the word "final" was never defined. Kimble Shaw and 
Gregory Ward made it clear that no plans would be "final" until Brighton approved the 
plans. See, e.g.. Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:501) ("If Brighton Corporation would 
14In closing argument, Brighton argued that it was significant that Ward testified 
that although he hoped Brighton would approve his plans, he did not believe that they 
would. Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:521). This does not mean that the plans did 
not comply with all reasonable requirements that could be imposed by Brighton or that 
Brighton should not have approved the plans. It simply reflects the fact that Ward had 
lost all confidence that Brighton would ever act in good faith and approve the plans. 
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have approved those plans, then they'd be final plans; but since Brighton Corporation 
didn't approve those plans underneath the settlement, we wanted to continue to work 
towards those and that's why we continued on to October, 1999 plans."); Testimony of 
Kimble Shaw (R. 344) ("I would keep adding and deleting information as required, as 
requested until we had a clear set of drawings that we could all agree on."). The plans 
were never approved by Brighton and therefore, the plans were not "final." They were 
"final" in the sense that Ward believed that he had complied with all the requirements 
needed to obtain approval. Brighton even stipulated at trial that Ward believed he had 
complied with all the requirements necessary for plan approval. See Trial Transcript, 
Vol.. II (R. 1751:482). 
2. Detailed drawings of the north porch. Brighton's argument was that a "heavy 
black line" was used by Shaw to illustrate the grading for the north porch and that in the 
October 28, 1999 letter, Brighton stated that the "heavy black line" was not sufficient. 
First, this point illustrates the failure of the parties to reach a meeting of the minds on the 
"settlement" and why the "proposed settlement agreement" was too vague and ambiguous 
to constitute a binding contract. Ward does not believe that a term of the contract 
between the parties was that his architect could not use a heavy black line to illustrate 
finished grade. Ward understood that Brighton wanted additional drawings of the north 
porch, which were provided to Brighton by Shaw. See Trial Exhibits Nos. 17, 18, 20, 10, 
11, and 7. 
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On this point, the trial court commented that "[i]f Mr. Shaw tells Mr. Richardson, 
that black line means an elevation at such a level, then Mr. Richardson is either going to 
have to say, I agree with that or I don't." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:540). Neil 
Richardson, Brighton's expert, never testified that the "heavy black line was insufficient.' 
Consequently, trial court would should have found in Ward's favor on this point. 
3. "New" and "proposed" easements. The proposed settlement required Ward to 
acknowledge Brighton's waterline easement, which was conceded by Brighton to have 
been lowered into the ground and extended from its original position. See, e.g. 
Testimony of Mary Barton (R. 1750:142-43). Consequently, there is no dispute that the 
waterline is different than it was originally~i.e., it was "extended" by Brighton. Ward 
showed the "extension" on the survey and labeled it a "new" and "proposed" easement. 
Brighton's sole objection was that Ward used the words "new" and "proposed" to 
describe the easements. This description was accurate. 
The trial court rejected Brighton's objection on this point, stating that he wasn't 
concerned about semantics and that "there's no fundamental objection to this because its 
still the same exact location?" Trial Transcript, Vol. I (R. 1750:86, 143, 148). 
4. Placement of the sewer line. Ward originally placed the sewer line across the 
middle of the property because that is where the sewer district contemplated the line 
would run and because it would avoid unnecessary destruction of trees. Ward put the 
sewer line on the west side of the property on the October 1999 Plans which Brighton 
refused to review. The trial court stated that "if the only problem here was the sewer line 
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there wouldn't be any problem." Trial Transcript Vol. II (R. 1751:257, lines 17-18). In 
addition, the trial court stated at the conclusion of trial that, with regard to the location of 
the sewer line, "[i]f there were circumstances, for instance, that require cutting down of 
trees and other things to go west and along that route and you can go right up a driveway 
on the other and there isn't a gravity problem or anything else, then they [Brighton] ought 
to be reasonable about that." Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill (R: 1752:597). It is fair to "glean" 
from the record that the trial court rejected this point as an adequate basis for Brighton to 
reject Ward's plans. 
5. South side patio. Ward proposed terracing the south patio to comply with FCOZ. 
Neil Richardson testified that he believed that the tiered retaining wall would not comply 
with FCOZ. Kimble Shaw and Greg Ward disagreed. The trial court refused to allow 
Ward's expert, Carl Eriksson, to testify on this issue. However, the evidence presented at 
trial was that the retaining wall was less than six feet at the comer of the planter box in 
question which was used to terrace the wall. See Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:514-
15). There were no findings of fact made on this issue by the trial court. 
6. Updated survey. First, it is important to note that the October 28, 1998 letter does 
not require an updated survey of the entire property. Second, the March 3, 1999 hearing 
transcript indicates that an updated survey was only required to address in detail "areas of 
disturbance." See Trial Exhibit No. 1 (March 3, 1999 Transcript) at 5, lines 2-4; Trial 
Exhibit No. 2 (October 28, 1999 letter) (requesting a copy of the original survey). The 
survey submitted by Ward showed adequate detail in the "areas of disturbance." Third, 
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Ward's evidence was that an updated survey was provided to Brighton as soon as the 
snow in the canyon receded enough to allow a surveyor access to the property. 
Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:467); Trial Exhibit No. 46. 
Relating to this point, the trial court remarked that although Neil Richardson 
testified that he thought the survey that accompanied the June 1999 Supplements wasn't 
accurate, Richardson did not address the fact that the survey was done by a bona fide 
surveyor and that it was Brighton's burden to show "by some preponderance of the 
evidence that his survey's inadequate." Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:541, lines 1-
10). This can fairly be read to indicate that the trial court found that the objection to the 
survey was not a sufficient basis for Brighton to reject Ward's plans. 
7. Color board and transparency of survey. Ward testified that he had already 
given Brighton the color board and the transparency of the survey. Testimony of Greg 
Ward. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:447-48, 486-87). According to Brighton, the 
"color board" was "not a big deal." Testimony of Mary Barton, Trial Transcript, Vol. I 
(R. 1750:132). When Brighton made comments to Ward about his plans, Brighton never 
raised the color board or the transparency as an area of noncompliance. Testimony of 
Greg Ward, Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 1751:488, 534). The trial court did not make any 
specific findings on these two issues, but did indicate that it felt it would have been better 
for Ward to submit another copy of the color board and the transparency, even if Brighton 
already had in its possession identical copies of those items. Trial Transcript, Vol. II (R. 
1752:539). 
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Ward substantially complied with the "settlement" by having previously delivered 
a copy of the color board and transparency to Brighton and Ward reasonably relied on 
Brighton's failure to raise this as an area of deficiency in its earlier responses to the April 
1999 Plans or the June 1999 Supplements. See, e.g.. Cache County v. Beus. 1999 UT 
App 134, ffif 36-37, 978 P.2d 1043, 1050 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (under doctrine of 
substantial compliance, court should determine the materiality of a breach and decide 
whether the party has substantially complied). 
8. Corrected version of "support documents/' Mary Barton admitted at trial that 
the prior plans submitted by Ward (which included the so-called "support documents") 
were not to be withdrawn until Brighton approved Ward's latest plans. Testimony of 
Mary Barton (R. 1751:117). Ward testified that he intended to withdraw those "support 
documents" at the appropriate time and did not intend to resubmit those documents to Salt 
Lake County. Testimony of Greg Ward (R. 1751:533-34). 
The purpose of this requirement was Brighton's concern that inaccurate documents 
would be on file with Salt Lake County. The requirement presupposes that Ward 
intended to refile the support documents. If the documents were not resubmitted to the 
county, there would be no need to correct them and submit them to Brighton. The trial 
court did not make any reference to this point. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW WARD'S EXPERT AND 
FACT WITNESS, CARL ERIKSSON, TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has explained that n[e]xpert testimony is required 
f[w]here the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular 
trades or professions' as in cases involving medical doctors, architects, and engineers." 
Preston & Chambers. P.C. v. Koller. 943 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting 
Wvcalis v. Guardian Title. 780 P.2d 821, 826 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). See also Ortiz 
v. Geneva Rock Products. Inc.. 939 P.2d 1213, 1217 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Expert 
testimony is useful in professions that require a high degree of specialized knowledge 
such as engineering); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Company. 711 P.2d 250, 254 
(Utah 1985) (trial court erred in refusing to consider the testimony of an engineer relating 
to compliance with building code requirements in a case dealing with the negligent design 
of retaining walls). 
In this case, Brighton argued that it properly rejected Ward's plans because, among 
other things, (1) the plans were not "final" plans; (2) the plans did not comply with the 
zoning ordinance ("FCOZ"); and (3) Ward's drawings did not have enough detail. Ward 
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attempted to call an engineer, Carl Eriksson, who had over 26 years of experience in 
reviewing plans for compliance with building and zoning codes, to testify, among other 
things, that Ward had submitted a complete set of plans; that the plans complied with 
FCOZ; and that Ward's plans were sufficiently detailed and as clear as any plans he had 
ever seen. 
The trial court had allowed Brighton's architect to testify on these issues. 
However, the trial court refused to allow Carl Eriksson to testify on these same issues 
because (1) Eriksson had not read the settlement agreement and (2) the court felt that 
whether Salt Lake County would approve Ward's plans was irrelevant. Trial Transcript, 
Vol. II (R. 1751:233). Mr. Eriksson did not need to read the settlement agreement to 
testify as an expert in this case. Mr. Eriksson reviewed the plans and the objections to 
those plans and was prepared and qualified to testify on the legitimacy of the objections. 
The trial court's second reason for disallowing Mr. Eriksson's testimony 
presumably is directed to Mr. Eriksson's testimony as a fact witness. Rule 601 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence provides that every person with personal knowledge is presumed 
to be competent to be a fact witness. Utah R. Evid. 601; Utah R. Evid. 602. Mr. Eriksson 
had personal knowledge that the design in question had already been approved by Salt 
Lake County as complying with FCOZ. 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WARD'S 1995 APPLICATION FOR A 
DETERMINATION THAT CONSENT TO BUILD THE CABIN HAD BEEN 
UNREASONABLY WITHHELD 
The trial court erred when it denied Ward's application for a determination that 
consent had been unreasonably withheld in 1995, because Brighton's grounds for 
rejecting Ward's plans were neither expressed in the restrictive covenants nor reasonable. 
After the October 4, 1994 order was issued, enjoining Ward from beginning construction, 
Ward submitted revised plans to Brighton that eliminated the basement and the loft and 
reduced the square footage of each floor below 1,200 square feet. 
The only evidence presented by Brighton in support of the reasonableness of its 
rejection of Ward's plans was the testimony of Neil Richardson, who stated that: (1) the 
attic could conceivably be converted at some later date to a loft; (2) the pitch of the 
proposed cabin!s roof was 8/12 (Richardson asserted that the "preferred" Alpine design in 
Utah was a 3/12 pitch), and the plans were ambiguous regarding the total roof height; (3) 
the elevations shown on the plans were different than some topographical map previously 
provided to Richardson; and (4) in Richardson' opinion, the proposed plans did not meet 
the Wasatch Canyons Development Standards. 
Each of these grounds for rejection was either unreasonable or against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Ward's plans completely eliminated the loft and was designed so 
that it was incapable of holding live loads. Transcript of July 13, 1995 Hearing 
(R. 1753:21). There is nothing in the Special Warranty Deed prescribing the pitch of the 
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roof. Richardson conceded that the Wasatch Master Plan's study found an 8/12 pitch 
acceptable. (R.1753, at 54-55).15 There was no evidence presented at the hearing that the 
topography on the proposed plans was wrong. Salt Lake County officials stated that the 
plans complied with the Wasatch Canyon Development Standards, were clear in their 
presentation, and could easily be understood for an approval process regarding nthe 
proposed placement, plans, and design" of the cabin. July 13, 1995 Hearing Exh. No. 15. 
In light of Brighton's objections, which were either unsupported by the evidence 
or unreasonable, the trial court should have granted Ward's application for a 
determination that approval had been unreasonably withheld. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECUSING JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG AND 
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REMOVE JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG FROM 
THIS ACTION FOR BIAS AND FOR DENYING WARD HIS DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Ward requests that Judge Young be removed from this case because his unfair 
rulings have demonstrated actual bias against Ward. Furthermore, the trial court's 
partiality has effectively denied Ward due process. It is axiomatic that parties in a 
judicial proceeding are entitled to have their matter heard and decided by a judicial officer 
who is free of any hint or suggestion of possible impartiality. This Court has made clear 
that, "a judge should recuse himself when his impartiality might reasonably be 
15Brighton's asserting the pitch of the roof as grounds for rejecting Ward's plans 
appears even more pretextual and disingenuous in light of the fact that plaintiffs cabin on 
the adjoining property has a 12/12 pitch. (R.1753:20; R.1744:270). 
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questioned." State v. Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 
1220 (1988)) (citing Utah Code of Judicial Conduct). The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 
provides that "[a] judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 
3E.1 These standards "may require recusal when no actual bias is shown." Neely, 748 
P.2datl094. 
In 1996, while this case was pending, James Jardine and numerous other attorneys 
at Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, who serve as lead counsel for Brighton, played a high profile 
and publicly advertised role in Judge Young's closely contested retention election. Ward 
asked Judge Young to recuse himself on this basis, but Judge Young refused. The matter 
was then referred to Judge Leslie Lewis in accordance with Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. When reviewing the issue, Judge Lewis applied the wrong standard, 
erroneously stating that Ward was required to show actual bias in order to obtain Judge 
Young's recusal. Court's Ruling by Judge Leslie A. Lewis (R. 718-19). The law is clear 
that the burden of showing actual bias should not have shifted to Ward until "[a]fter 
[Judge Young] had been approved to continue." State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 
(Utah 1998). Judge Lewis should have ordered Judge Young to be recused if his 
impartiality might reasonably have been questioned. 
Failure to recuse constitutes reversible error if there is "a showing of actual bias or 
an abuse of discretion." Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094. However, Ward maintains that the 
law requiring a showing of "actual" bias on appeal presupposes that the complaining 
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party is seeking to overturn a decision of the trial court based on bias. See, e.g.. State v. 
Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah 1988) (stating that failure of judge to recuse himself 
where impartiality might reasonably be questioned "does not necessarily mean that the 
defendant is entitled to a new trial."); Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 610 (same). Ward is not 
requesting that this Court reverse any of Judge Young's rulings on the basis that he was 
biased. The Court can overturn those rulings on the clear error encompassed in the 
rulings themselves. Ward is simply seeking to have Judge Young removed from future 
proceedings regarding this matter to ensure that Ward will obtain an impartial and fair 
resolution of this case. Consequently, the reasoning behind requiring a showing of actual 
bias is not present and the Court should not apply this higher standard for recusal. 
In any event, Ward can show sufficient evidence of actual bias through the 
cumulative effect of repeated unfair rulings by Judge Young. Judge Young has 
repeatedly prejudged this case, as evidenced on at least two occasions where Judge 
Young announced his decisions on motions before he had reviewed them, and before 
Ward had an opportunity to respond. The most egregious of these was Judge Young's 
order allowing Bnghton to pave a road across Ward's land without providing Ward notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. 
By ruling that Ward must pay Brighton attorney's fees as a condition of review (on 
a summary judgment motion, no less, and in the face of clearly disputed facts), Judge 
Young rewrote the Special Warranty Deed and made it impossible for Ward to even get a 
review by Brighton, let alone approval. 
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Judge Young's unfair rulings continued through trial, where he announced that he 
would not consider the latest set of plans submitted to Brighton in October 1999, because 
Brighton had refused to review them. Then, Judge Young refused to allow Ward's 
witness, Carl Eriksson, to testify regarding whether Ward's plans were deficient as 
claimed by Brighton in their case in chief. 
When reviewing Judge Young's refusal to recuse himself, Judge Lewis also 
questioned the delay in Ward's bringing the motion requesting recusal. While it is true 
that the affidavit asserting bias was to be filed "as soon as practicable after the case has 
been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known," Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b) (1997), this 
requirement had not been dispositively defined under Utah law at the time Ward filed his 
motion. In discussing the purpose of the timeliness rule, this Court explained in Madsen 
v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n. 767 P.2d 538, 543 (Utah 1988), that "[a] 
party who has a reasonable basis for moving to disqualify a judge may not delay in hope 
of first obtaining a favorable ruling and then complain only if the result is unfavorable." 
Id. at 542. Such a tactic is not at issue here. Ward filed his affidavit after learning about 
the potential for bias before any further rulings were issued by Judge Young. This Court 
has recognized that although a motion to disqualify must be made promptly, such a 
motion "should not be undertaken lightly." Madsen. 767 P.2d 542. It is one thing to 
delay making such a motion until after the judge makes an unfavorable ruling as in 
Madsen. It is quite another thing to consider such a motion carefully while nothing 
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substantive is happening in the case, and where no one will be prejudiced by such careful 
consideration. 
Furthermore, Judge Young's bias became even more apparent after Ward filed his 
motion seeking recusal. Rule 63(b) provides that "[n]o party shall be entitled in any case 
to file more than one affidavit" requesting recusal. Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b). Thus, Ward 
was prohibited from filing another affidavit alleging bias and prejudice, despite the fact 
that Judge Young's bias became more pronounced. 
Removing Judge Young from presiding over further proceedings in this matter is 
the only way to adequately protect Ward's due process rights. Under both the Utah 
Constitution and the United States Constitution, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; U.S. Const, am. 
XIV. One of the most fundamental principles of due process is that "all parties to a case 
are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge." Anderson v. Industrial Commission, 696 
P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). As this Court has previously explained, "[a] biased 
decision maker is not only constitutionally prohibited, 'but our system of law has always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.'" Vali Convalescent & Care 
Institution v. Industrial Commission, 649 P.2d 33, 37 (Utah 1982) (quoting In re 
Murchison. 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 349 U.S.133, 136 (1955)). 
Due process demands a new trial "when the appearance of unfairness is so plain 
that [the Court is] left with the abiding impression that a reasonable person would find the 
hearing unfair." Bunnell v. Industrial Commission. 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n.l (Utah 1987). 
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Judge Young's consistently biased rulings can leave this Court and any reasonable person 
with no impression other than an impression of unfairness. Ward has been denied the use 
of his property for six years because Judge Young has refused to compel Brighton to 
exercise its responsibility to grant timely approval of Ward's plans. In fact, by granting 
Brighton's ex parte motion to pave the roadway running across Ward's land, Judge Young 
has allowed Brighton more use of Ward's land than he has allowed Ward himself. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court should grant Ward the following 
relief: 
1. The Court should rule that the trial court erred in holding that the parties 
had entered into a binding and enforceable contract and settlement agreement. 
2. The Court should rule that the trial court erred in ruling on summary 
judgment (1) that Ward must compensate Brighton for all further costs, including 
attorney's fees, associated with any future review by Brighton of any new plans submitted 
by Ward as a condition of reviewing those plans; (2) that it was reasonable for Brighton 
to require a licensed architect to sign Ward's plans; and (3) that it was reasonable for 
Brighton to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance of Salt Lake County 
in reviewing plans submitted by Ward. 
3. The Court should rule that the trial court erred in ruling that Brighton could 
pave the roadway over Ward's Property, and that the trial court violated Ward's due 
process rights in granting this motion without providing Ward with adequate notice and a 
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fair opportunity to be heard. In addition, the Court should order that Brighton remove the 
pavement and restore Ward's Property to its original condition. 
4. The Court should rule that the trial court erred in refusing to consider the 
latest set of plans submitted to Brighton by Ward and should direct the trial court that any 
future hearings must be held on the latest set of plans submitted by Ward. 
5. The Court should rule that the trial court erred in holding that Brighton 
properly rejected the plans submitted by Brighton to Ward in 1999, and that Ward is 
allowed to build either the April 1999 Plans or the October 1999 Plans if he so desires. 
6. The Court should rule that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Carl 
Eriksson to testify as an expert and as a fact witness at the trial of this matter. 
7. The Court should rule that the trial court erred in refusing to rule that 
Brighton had unreasonably withheld approval of the plans submitted by Ward at the July 
13, 1995 hearing, and should further rule that Ward may build those plans if he so desires. 
8. The Court should rule that the trial court erred in not recusing Judge Young 
from this case and that Judge Young should be removed from this case and the case 
reassigned due to Judge Young's bias and denying Ward his due process rights 
throughout the proceedings below. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ K day of July, 2000. 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MacRAE, L.L.P. 
Attorneys for Appellant Gregory M. Ward 
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Mail tax not i ce to fc+Rfil A CfUTX Address 7 ? 0 g n y ///{> 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEEO 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah corporat ion, organised and e x i s t i n g 
under the l a v s of the S t a t e of Utah, w i t h i t s p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e at S a l t 
Lako C i t y , of County of S a l t Lake, S t a t e of Utah. GRANTOR, hereby 
m CONVEYS AND WARRANTS a g a i n s t a l l c la iming by, through or under i t to 
M ISABEL M. COATS and HALTER H. COATS, as J o i n t T r u s t e e s of the I s a b e l 
£v{ M. C o a t s T r u s t d a t e d D e c e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 5 , GRANTEE8, o f Merced , 
O C a l i f o r n i a , - f o r the sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10.00) and o t h e r good and 
QO v a l u a b l e con s i d e r a t l o n s , the f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d t r a c t of land i n 
CO S a l t Lake County, S t a t e of Utahi 
m B e g i n n i n g a t the N o r t h w e s t c o r n e r of Lot 29, Block 4, 
S i l v e r Lake Summer R e s o r t , a c c o r d i n g t o the o f f i c i a l 
p l a t t h e r e o f on f i l e and of record in the S a l t Lake 
County R e c o r d e r ' s o f f i c e , and running thence South 
87o33*0a East along the North l i n e of sa id Lot 29, 115.5 
f e e t (Record e q u a l s E a s t ) ; thence South 2°27 , 0* N e s t 
198.5 f e e t t o t h e S o u t h boundary l i n e of Grantor's 
p r o p e r t y ; thence North 87°33 '0" West a long the South 
bouidry l i n e of Grantor's property 115.5 f e e t (being the 
property conveyed t o Grantor under Warranty Deed dated 
1 / 2 8 / 6 1 AB r e c o r d e d 8 / 2 / 6 1 as e n t r y number 1791991 In 
Book 1827 Page 346 in the o f f i c e of the Sa l t Lake County 
Recorder) ; t h e n c e North 2 ° 2 7 ' 0 a East 198.5 f e e t (Deed 
e q u a l s North) t o t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g . (Cont. .5263 
acres more or l e s s ) 
B a s i s o f b e a r i n g : Line be tween the S a l t Lake County 
Monument found a t the i n t e r s e c t i o n of Pine S t r e e t and 
Wasatch S t r e e t t o S a l t Lake County Mounument found in 
P r o s p e c t S t r e e t * S a i d l i n e be ing South 28 Degrees 48 
Minutes 47 Seconds E a s t AS s u r v e y e d . Bear ings were 
r o t a t e d 2 D e g r e e s 27 Minutes c l o c k w i s e as needed t o 
conform t o s t r e e t c e n t e r l i n e d a t a as shown on the S a l t 
Lake County area re ference , p l a t for Sect ion 35, Township 
2 South, Range 3 Eas t , S a l t Lake Base and Meridian. 
RESERVING unto the Grantor, i t s successors and a s s i g n s , 
a permanent e a s e m e n t and r i g h t - o f - w a y for roadway and 
u t i l i t y p u r p o s e s o v e r and a c r o s s t h e h e r e i n a f t e r 
d e s c r i b e d p r e m i s e s t o be used in common by the Grantor 
and Grantee h e r e i n , and o t h e r named Grantees of the 
Grantor for c o n s t r u c t i o n , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , maintenance, 
and r e p a i r of a roadway f o r l n g r e a s and e g r e s s and 
u t i l i t y e a s e m e n t s f o r w a t e r l l n e a , e e w e r l i n e s , 
e l e c t r i c a l l l n e e , t e l e p h o n e l i n e a , n a t u r a l gaa l l n e a , 
and other u t i l i t i e s i n c i d e n t a l to a r e s i d e n t i a l use , t o -
w i t ! 
Beg inn ing a t the S o u t h w e s t c o r n e r of Lot 29, Block 4, 
S i l v e r Lake Summer Resort according to the o f f i c i a l p l a t 
t h e r e o f on f i l e and of r e c o r d in the S a l t Lake County 
Recorder ' s O f f i c e , and running t h e n c e South 87°33*0* 
Eaet 115.5 f e e t ; t h e n c e South 2°8740* Weat 20 f e e t ; 
• thence North * 7 ° 3 3 ' 0 * Weat 115.5 f e e t ; thence North 
2°27'0* 20 f e e t t o the p o i n t of beginning. 
The above-named Or an t o r , Grantee, and other named Grantees thereof R 
s h a l l use the easements and r ight -o f -waye granted by t h i s inatrument 0 \ 
i n common w i t h due r e g a r d t o the r i g h t s of o t h e r s and t h e i r use of <J\ 
such eaeements and r i g h t - o f - w a y s , and such eaaements and r ight -of -ways <Tk 
s h a l l not be ueed in Any way that w i l l impair the r i g h t s of o thers t o E? 
use i t . No party s h a l l in any way obs truc t the use of sa id easements c? 
and r i g h t - o f - w a y * t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of o t h e r a ho ld ing 4 b e n e f i c i a l r o 
i n t e r e s t there in . ^J 
GO 
O 
Grantor further reserves unto i t se l f , i ta eucceeeore and asslgna, 
•rnancnt waterllne uaso»*nt as the tame now exls ta under tha abovt-
i rribed pramlaea convoyed hare in for tha now axiating raaidantial 
-4 ©rline to the raaidance on Crantor'a proparty together with tha 
r« - t of lngraaa and agraat for tha maintenance aud rapalr of aaid 
n ting watar Una. 
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS. Tha above-deecribed premlaea ahall ba 
- i t i t e d to tha c o n s t r u c t i o n of a a i n g l a r a a i d a n t i a l bui lding 
containing not In axcaet of t -e lve hundrad aquara faat on aach floor, 
~, containing not more than two f loors , Outalda dacklng not undar 
roof ahall not ba includad in aaid twelve hundrad aquara foot 
^.ai tat ion. 
Grantor axpraaaly reserves the r ight to ravlaw and approve the 
propoaad placement, plans, and daalgna for any improvements to be 
located upon'tha above-described property, which approval ahall be 
timely and ahall not be unreasonably withheld* 
Subject to an axiating right-of-way agreement datad September 12, 
'95 0, between Brighton Corporation aa Grantor And David 8. Dranaflald 
and Sarah Adelle Dranaflald.aa Grantees, togathar* with othara in 
common aa recorded September 18, 1990, in Book 6253 Page 2002, entry 
Number 4967074 in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Subject to that certain waterllne easement dated June 10, 1991, 
from Brighton Corporation, Grantor, to S i lver Lake Company, Grantee of 
a prepetual waterl lne eaaement 10 f ee t in width extending along the 
Western property line of the premises conveyed herein. 
Subject to any and a l l other exist ing right-of-waye and eaaaaenta 
of record. 
Subject to the restrict ion that upon the tranafer or a a l e o f the 
above-described premises the named Grantor and i ta aucceasors and 
ass igns who are descendants of Mary h. Barton are granted a f i r s t 
r ight of refuaal for the purchaae thereof , and Fred A. Koreton and 
Lucy W. Koreton and the ir deacendanta are granted a aecond right of 
refuaal for the purchase thereof. A sa le or tranafer of the above-
described premlaea to the deacendanta of I sabe l K. Coata ahall be 
exempt from aaid described f i r s t and aecond righta of refuaal but said 
terma ahall be binding upon the tranafer of aaid premlaea to any party 
not a descendant of Isabel K. Coats. 
The o f f i c e r s who sign th i s deed hereby c e r t i f y that th i s ueed and 
the t ranafer repreaented thereby wae duly a u t h o r i s e d under a 
resolution duly adopted by the Board of Dlrectora of the Grantor at a 
lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Orantor has cauaed i t s corporate name and 
aeal to be hereunto aff ixed b y . i t s duly authorized o f f l cera this 
_JXjiay of 3 * g i , 1991. 
cr •••BRIGHTON CORPORATION a Utah corporation, 
BY t X ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ U ^ 
KtrY rtortton Barton, President 
STATE Of UTAH ) 
t aa . 
County of Salt Lake) 
On the 3** day of Q ~ £ u 1991, before me, the undersigned, a 
notary PublicTn and for" o/County and S t a t e , pereonai ly appeared 
KARY KORETON BARTON, known to be to be the Pres ident .o f BRXGHTOK 
CORPORATION, the corporation that executed the within instrument, ana r^ 
known to me to be the person who executed the wi th in instrument on J% 
behalf of the corporation herein named, and he duly acknowledged tome CH 
that aaid corporation executed the aame in pureuanoe._.o£/e_* resolution £*• 
of ita Board of Oirectora. j vf _ ?_ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commieaion Explresi Residing a t t 
Exhibit B 
PROPERTY USE AGREEMENT 
This Agreement i s made t h i s ^? day of / ^ ^ ^ l ' 1 9 5 1 ' 
among BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , and MARY M. 
BARTON, here inafter c o l l e c t i v e l y referred to as "BRIGHTON", and 
ISABEL M. COASTS and WALTER H. COATS, as J o i n t T r u s t e e s of the 
ISABEL M. COATS TRUST dated December 10, 1905, and ISABEL M. 
COATS, I n d i v i d u a l l y , h e r e i n a f t e r c o l l e c t i v e l y r e f e r r e d to as 
"COATS", and FRED A. MORETON and LUCY W. MORETON, as J o i n t 
Tenants, here inafter c o l l e c t i v e l y referred to as "MORETON". 
WHEREAS, BRIGHTON has s o l d to COATS a c e r t a i n p a r c e l of 
proper ty 115.5 f e e t by 198.5 f e e t from the Wester ly p o r t i o n of 
the Brighton property, and BRIGHTON has sold to MORETON a parcel 
of property of the d i m e n s i o n s of approx imate ly 112.5 f e e t by 
274.25 f e e t c o n s t i t u t i n g the most E a s t e r l y p o r t i o n of the 
Brighton property, 
NOW, THEREFORE, i t i s hereby AGREED among the p a r t i e s as 
fol lows in regard to the use of said propert i e s : 
1. That as between BRIGHTON and COATS as adjacent property 
owners , each party a g r e e s tha t what p r e s e n t l y c o n s i s t of the 
Easterly and Southerly port ion of the e x i s t i n g c ircu lar driveway 
and the property in the immediate v i c i n i t y thereof w i l l be 
r e s t o r e d to a natura l s t a t e of w i l d f l o w e r s , aspen and p i n e , 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the e x i s t i n g area. The r e s t o r e d area w i l l be 
ma in ta ined by the r e s p e c t i v e property owners wi th no v e h i c u l a r 
parking thereon. The e x i s t i n g pines , aspen and briar within the 
present c i rcu lar driveway w i l l not be removed by e i ther party and 
w i l l remain as a buffer zone between the two adjacent parcels . 
2. For purposes of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n only in t h i s agreement 
the COATS property sha l l be referred to as Parcel A, the BRIGHTON 
proper ty as Parce l B and the MORETON property as Parcel C as to 
the South 140.5 f e e t t h e r e o f and P a r c e l 2 as to the North 122.5 
f ee t thereof . 
3. BRIGHTON and MORETON agree that MORETON w i l l not make 
any app l i ca t ion for a bui lding permit nor w i l l MORETON construct 
a r e s i d e n t i a l b u i l d i n g on p a r c e l C of t h e i r purchased p r o p e r t y , 
but that MORETON w i l l p l a c e any r e s i d e n t i a l b u i l d i n g which i t 
d e s i r e s to construct on Parcel 2 of the purchased property. 
4. BRIGHTON hereby g r a n t s unto COATS and descendants the 
f i r s t * r i g h t of r e f u s a l to purchase the remaining BRIGHTON 
CORPORATION p r o p e r t y and BRIGHTON hereby grants to MORETON and 
descendants the second r ight of refusa l to purchase the remaining 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION property. If such purchas r ights are not 
e x e r c i s e d by t h o s e p a r t i e s owning the p r i o r i t i e s to purchase, 
then the owner may s e l l the same to an o u t s i d e purchaser on the 
same terms and c o n d i t i o n s that the same were o f f e r e d to those 
holding the f i r s t r ight of purchase and second right of purchase 
referred to in t h i s paragraph. 
5. COATS, BRIGHTON, and MORETON agree to part ic ipate in the 
expense of maintenance of the road r i g h t - o f - w a y e q u a l l y as to 
t h a t p o r t i o n which c r o s s e s the COATS property . BRIGHTON and 
MORETON agree to share e q u a l l y in the maintenance and c o s t s of 
the road r ight -o f -ways as the same cross the BRIGHTON property to 
g i v e i n g r e s s and e g r e s s to the MORETON property , David S. 
D r a n s f i e l d and Sarah Adele D r a n s f i e l d , who are the owners of a 
r i g h t - o f - w a y for i n g r e s s and e g r e s s a c r o s s the COATS, BRIGHTON 
and MORETON p r o p e r t i e s s h a l l be o b l i g a t e d t o . c o n t r i b u t e to the 
p a r t i e s f o r t h e i r f a i r and p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h a r e of road 
cons truc t ion and maintenance on such r ight -of -ways . Each of the 
p a r t i e s h e r e t o s h a l l r e c e i v e compensat ion from the named 
D r a n s f i e l d s to the e x t e n t tha t the D r a n s f i e l d r i g h t - o f - w a y 
extends upon each of the propert ies of the named part i e s to t h i s 
agreement. 
6. The p a r t i e s h e r e t o agree that the des ignated 20 foot 
r ight -o f -way as descr ibed on the deed from Brighton to Coats as 
used for roadway p u r p o s e s s h a l l c o n s i s t of a s i n g l e lane g r a v e l 
roadway for veh icu lar t r a v e l , and that there sha l l be no parking 
of any v e h i c l e s on the roadway p o r t i o n or on e i t h e r s i d e of the 
roadway port ion wi th in sa id 20 foot width right-of-way. Any and 
a l l u t i l i t i e s i n s t a l l e d w i th in the boundaries of said designated CT* 
CO 
20 foot r ight -o f -way s h a l l be constructed in compliance with t h e n j ^ 
e x i s t i n g S a l t Lake County ordinances . c* 
NOTWITHSTANDING any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s hereof or any o ther 
p r o v i s i o n s of the Deed of Conveyance from Brighton to Coats , i t 
i s e x p r e s s l y agreed among the p a r t i e s here to that Coats , at i t s 
so le expense, may at any time re locate said 20 foot r ight -of -way, 
referred <o in the Coats Deed, any distance i t may e l e c t farther 
to the North of i t s p r e s e n t l o c a t i o n , so long as any such new 
r ight -of -way connects to the now e x i s t i n g roadway on the Brighton 
proper ty (B) at the common proper ty l i n e between the Coats 
proper ty (A) and s a i d Br ighton p r o p e r t y , and s u b j e c t f u r t h e r to 
the condi t ion that the curvature on any such new right-of-way as 
i t t ransvers . e s the Coats proper ty s h a l l be engineered in such 
manner that the Sa l t Lake County f i r e equipment serving said area 
can n e g o t i a t e such roadway w i t h o u t d i f f i c u l t y . Coats , at i t s 
e x p e n s e , w i l l conduct a survey and obtaHrn* a metes and bounds 
survey d e s c r i p t i o n of such proposed new right-of-way as i t s h a l l 
t r a v e r s e the Coats proper ty (A) and connect with the e x i s t i n g 
road r ight -o f -way at the common property l i n e with the Brighton 
proper ty (B). 
As f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n to Brighton and Moreton for the 
granting of the p r i v i l e g e to Coats to re locate said r ight -o f -way , 
Coats covenants and agrees that Coats w i l l not erect any type of 
bui lding or s tructure upon that portion of the Coats property (A) 
w i t h i n the boundar ie s of the o ld Forest A l l e y (as vacated) or 
upon Lot 29. 
At such time as any such new right-of-way i s agreed upon by 
the p a r t i e s in accordance w i th the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s s e t f o r t h 
above-herein, i t i s agreed that the former 20 foot r ight -of -way 
as d e s c r i b e d in the C o a t s Deed s h a l l be r e l e a s e d . I t i s 
understood and agreed by the par t i e s hereto that the r ight -of -way 
in favor of David S. D r a n s f i e l d and Sarah Adele Drans f i e ld for 
i n g r e s s and e g r e s s to t h e i r p r o p e r t y w i l l be a d j u s t e d t o 
tranverse under or across such newly designated right-of-way, and 
that t h e i r pr ior r ight -o f -way reserved over and across the Coats 
CD 
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7. The 1991 p r o p e r t y t axes upon the r e s p e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s 
as purchased or r e t a i n e d by the named p a r t i e s s h a l l be p r o - r a t e d 
among them as of t h e d a t e of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o n v e y a n c e s , 
r e l y i n g upon the 1991 S a l t Lake County Treasu re r ' s Tax B i l l i n g s . 
Commencing January 1, 1992, each p a r t y s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e for 
i t s r e s p e c t i v e tax a s s e s s m e n t s . 
0. BRIGHTON h e r e b y g r a n t s to MORETON a 50 y e a r l e a s e upon 
the p r o p e r t y s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s c r i b e d as P a r c e l C l y i n g a d j a c e n t 
and to* the South of P a r c e l 2 fo r the sum of $1.00, r e c e i p t of 
which i s he r eby a c k n o w e l d g e d by BRIGHTON from MORETON, and 
BRIGHTON f u r t h e r covenan t s t h a t upon r eques t of MORETON i t w i l l 
convey sa id pa r ce l C by a S p e c i a l Warranty Deed from BRIGHTON t o 
MORETON f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of ONE DOLLAR s u b j e c t t o t h e 
r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t MORETON w i l l not bui ld a r e s i d e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e 
upon s a i d P a r c e l C. BRIGHTON f u r t h e r g r a n t s un to MORETON t h e 
e x c l u s i v e f i r s t r i g h t to renew s a i d -50 y e a r l e a s e upon s a i d 
P a r c e l C a t any time before the e x p i r a t i o n of the f r i s t 50 y e a r s , 
fo r t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of ONE DOLLAR, and MORETON s h a l l have t h e 
r i g h t t o c o n t i n u e t o e n t e r i n t o s u c c e s s i v e 50 y e a r l e a s e s fo r 
s a i d p r e m i s e s , in t h e e v e n t t h a t MORETON has no t r e q u e s t e d a 
conveyance of the same from BRIGHTON, 
9 . As be tween BRIGHTON and MORETON they r e s e r v e the r i g h t 
t o change the r o u t e of t h e e x i s t i n g roadway as i t c r o s s e s t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e p r e m i s e s upon d e t e r m i n a t i o n by them from a s u r v e y 
t h a t a d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n would be more p r a c t i c a l and s e r v e 
them and the D r a i n s f i e l d s in a b e t t e r way. The Wester ly p o r t i o n 
of the roadway and u t i l i t y easement as i t c rosses over and under 
the COATS proper ty may not be changed wi thout the express w r i t t e n 
c o n s e n t of the COATS p r o p e r t y owner . In the e v e n t t h a t a l l of 
t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o and David S. D r a n s f i e l d and Sarah Adele 
D r a n s f i e l d should e l e c t in w r i t i n g to move the e x i s t i n g roadway 
and u t i l i t y easement to a d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n ' a s i t I n t e r s e c t s t he 
v a r i o u s p rope r ty owners , then i f such new easement i s agreed upon 
by the p a r t i e s and conveyed by r e s p e c t i v e deeds of easement as CD 
n e c e s s a r y , and if such u t i l i t y easement does, in f a c t , make water ^ 
ID 
ava i lab le to the e x i s t i n g BRIGHTON residence, then in such event, 
BRIGHTON agrees to r e l e a s e the COATS property from the c e r t a i n 
permanent water i i n ^ r i g h t - o f - w a y which i t now owns over ar^ 
a c r o s s the COATS p r o p e r t y to s e r v e the now e x i s t i n g BRIGHTON 
res idence . 
10. The w i t h i n agreement s h a l l be binding upon the p a r t i e s 
h e r e t o and a l l of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s u c c e s s o r s , a s s i g n s , and 
d e s c e n d a n t s , and the terms hereof supercede any and a l l p r i o r 
o r a l agreements in ar\y
 w a v e n t e r e d i n t o or among the p a r t i e s i n 
respect to the subject matters s e t forth herein. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, t h i s Agreement i s executed the day an<j 
year previously s e t f^rth above here in . 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation 
' I t s JPfe'sident 
MARY M. B^ARTON', Indiv idual ly 
'"Brighton" 
WALTER M. COATS and ISABEL M. 
COATS, as Jo int Trustees of the 






J y /,/* ISABEL M. COATS/ Trustee 
(Cs jy/> fas ^/^~^ WALTER M. COATS, Trustee ^ 
L>7 f/y^f^A^— ISABEL M. COATS, Indiv idua l ly 
i^C<^^^^/7£K>~ , ^/ "COATS" 
K>r-^ />j#dcz-,</ s <rtt>&y y7 FTORETQN ^ — 


















IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




ISABEL M. COATS and 
WALTER M. COATS, et al. 
Defendants. 
















BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 3r<1 day of March, 1999, 
the above-entitled matter came on for Hearing before the 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following audiotape proceedings were had. 
E0E 
A S S O C I A T E D P R O F E S S I O N A L R E P O R T E R S , L C 
A P P E A R A N C E S 





















For the Defendant; 
JAMES S. JARDINE, ESQ 
SCOTT A. HAGEN, ESQ. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DOUGLAS J. PARRY, ESQ. 
PARRY MURRAY & WARD 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
3 
1 I  THE COURT: Good morning. The record may 6how we're 
2 A convened in the matter of Brighton Corporation, a Utah 
3 i corporation, versus Isabel Coats and Walter Coats, et al. 
4 | The case is 940905453. This is the date set for trial, 
5 | Counsel, will you first state your appearances, please. 
6 I MR. JARDINE: James Jardine and Scott Hagen for the 
7 I Plaintiff, Brighton Corporation, 
8 | MR. PARRY: Douglas Parry for the Defendants. 
9 I THE COURT: I€ve been informed informally that there€s 
10 I a stipulated resolution of this case, is that correct? 
11 MR. PARRY: If it can be stated correctly, yes. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Who will state it then correctly? 
13 J MR. JARDINE: Well, I have a lot of affection for Mr. 
14 I Parry; I have no doubt that he'll criticize me in some 
15 V fashion for the way I do this, Your Honor, but— 
16 I THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. JARDINE: It, in fact, Your Honor, is a conditional 
18 | settlement we'd like to read into the record. It's 
19 | conditional because certain actions remain to be taken. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. 
21 | MR. JARDINE: We propose t o s t a t e the agreement on t h e 
22 record— 
23 I THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
24 MR. JARDINE: —and then to formalize it later in an 
25 H order for the Court to sign, if the remaining i66ues and 
4 
1 g actions are satisfactorily resolved. And we would ask the 
2 U Court to continue the trial date, and I think Mr- Parry will 
3 | speak to that. We've agreed that we will review the 
4 | contemplated plans to be submitted to us, within seven days 
5 of receiving them, and I think Mr. Parry will ask you about 
6 I available trial dates within that time frame• 
7 | Let me see if I can state the agreement, and then we 
fj can deal with the trial date later. 
9 1 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
10 I MR. JARDINE: We sent a letter, dated October 28, 1998/ 
11 | to counsel for Mr. Ward, proposing a settlement and listing 
12 a number of issues. It46 our understanding that Defendants 
13 I have accepted the terras of that letter, with some additions 
14 A and some corrections, which I will attempt to state. 
15 I As a sort of principal point, the letter contemplates, 
16 I and the parties agree, that Mr. Ward will submit plans, 
17 | signed by an architect, to—for review to Brighton 
18 I Corporation. The parties have agreed that the plans will 
19 meet the requirements of listing of what should be included 
20 I of two checklists provided last night by Neil Richardson to 
21 J Kimball Shaw, with three exceptions. They would not need to 
22 | include work of a landscape architect. 
23 | MR. PARRY: Correct. 
24 | MR. JARDINE: They would not need to include a slope 







UNIDENTIFIED: Okay • 
MR. JARDINE: And the updated and detailed survey need 
only address in detail what are called "areas of 
disturbance" by the architects. 
5 I MR, PARRY: Correct• 
6 THE COURT: Okay, 
7 MR. JARDINE: Another change is that the letter of 
8 October 28, 199B, addresses the proposed patio on the south 
9 | and west of the proposed cabin. We modified our position on 
10 1 that patio in a letter dated February 22, 1999, and that 
11 U supersedes the October 28, 1998, letter on that issue and, 
2 in general, says that they may have a patio of the outlying 
13 | of the plans submitted to us, so long as it is step-down in 
14 | compliance with "F" Cause, a6 to the cut, 
15 I There remains an issue outstanding that the future 
16 1 planG submitted to U6 will address, which is the location 
17 | and design of the porch or front entrance proposed on the 
18 I north side- Brighton Corporation has not received final 
19 plans that they regard as adequate for that proposal, 
20 H including grading plans, <knd Brighton Corporation will 
2i J review the plans submitted to determine whether the proposed 
22 H plan/ ^n that respect, adversely impacts its water line, and 
73 6 t h e architects talked la6t night about what the detail would 
24 S ke needed for that review to be done. 
25 | Otherwise, the letters talk—the list includes a number 
6 
1 || of things, and I ju6t—I think it*s clear, but the plans 
2 H will also include reference to where permanent parking would 
3 I be and, also, how construction—there1 d be a description of 
4 how construction would be staged. 
5 | As I said, the final plans, as described in the letters 
6 I and as I've described today, will be submitted to Brighton 
7 A Corporation, which will, with its architect, review the 
8 | plans and respond within seven days of receiving them. 
9 I Brighton Corporation, we—the parties agree that 
10 | Brighton Corporation cannot pre-approve the plans until it 
11 | sees them, but if the issues raised in the letters of 
12 I October 28, 1998, and February 22, 1999, and the noted 
13 | ambiguities are addressed and resolved, Brighton Corporation 
14 & is not presently aware of other grounds on which it would 
15 I disapprove the plans. 
16 I There are other issues to address,. in terms of the 
17 fi Proposed settlement. A term of the proposed settlement is 
18 I that Mr. Ward will withdraw all plans filed to date with the 
19 county and only file, in the future, plans approved by 
20 | Brighton Corporation and the Court. Mr. Ward has expressed 
21 J a concern that, under *F" Cause, there may be an argument 
22 I that he is barred from building on his lot. The provision 
23| in question, as I understand it, is provision 19.72.030, 
24 I 'Development Standards,* and under that, paragraph 2(b), 
25 | which 6ay6: "If— Lots of record that meet unHAritfU- — 
7 
1 | minimum lot size requirement. If the underlying zone 
2 I permits a minimum lot size of smaller than one acre, then a 
3 | lot of record, approved prior to the effective date of the 
4 | ordinance codified in this chapter, that meets the minimum 
5 | lot size requirement set forth in the underlying zone 
6 I district, shall have a minimum lot size of one-half acre." 
7 A Brighton Corporation stipulates, and I think both the 
8 | parties stipulate, that this lot was created prior to the 
.9 I effective date, is greater than one-half acre and, 
10 | therefore, would not be precluded from building. And we 
11 stipulate further that you may include such a provision in 
12 | the final order so that that could be shown to the county. 
13 I I should note that it is a condition of this settlement 
14 I for Ward that if the county takes a different position, not 
15 I withstanding that, and refuses to recognize that, then the 
16 | settlement is not effective and Mr. Ward would be back in 
17 | his prior position. 
18 Did I state that correctly? 
19 MR. PARRY: Yes. I'm wondering whether we need to go 
20 that far on it, though. It may be that we can make some 
21 I sort of an adjustment to build on. There i6— 
22 THE COURT: You need to be sure your voice i6 being 
23 | heard clearly, Mr. Parry. 
24 | MR. PARRY: Yeah, I'll 6tand. I*m not sure we want to 



























THE COURT: Well, &6 I understand that provision, what 
they're saying is, you will cooperate with the grandfather 
status that was granted to that lot at an earlier time. 
MR. JARDINE: Here is the issue. We—that I think we 
want to be clear on—we do not intend, have no desire to 
have Mr. Ward adversely affected by that requirement. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. JARDINE: And we'll stipulate and have entered into 
an order any way to make sure that that requirement doesn't 
bar his being able to build. We—what the agreement is, 
however, is that all these prior plans, which are a source 
of contention between the parties, get withdrawn and— 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JARDINE: —that only the plans filed are ones 
we've approved and you've approved, and that we understood, 
if that was taken care of, that wasn't a problem. So that's 
why we structured it that way. 
MR. PARRY: Yeah. And our worry is that if all the 
plans are withdrawn— 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. PARRY: —that the county will then say this is 
something new, and we readdress this issue. You know, if we 
could get an order from the Court that says the Court ha6 
found that it fits within that exception, therefore, can— 
you know, anything—we're not adverse, obviously, to 
9 
1 | withdrawing the plans- We ju6t want to build the cabin-
2 THE COURT: You just don't want to be prejudiced by 
3 that withdrawal, in the event that they say you're starting 
4 afresh? 
5 MR- PARRY: That's correct- And we're— 
6 THE COURT: Well, and then I think they're—I think Mr. 
7 Jardine's position is consistent with supporting that 
8 position. 
9 MR- PARRY: I think so. I just wanted it (inaudible). 
10 THE COURT: So, I would be happy to sign a stipulated 
11 1 order that indicates that the withdrawal of the plans is not 
12 & withdrawal of the date of the filing, but simply the 
13 | content of the plans. 
14 MR. PARRY: Yeah. That—that would probably work. 
15 I MR. JARDINE: I think that's not a problem and, indeed, 
16 I I think if we have an order just saying that this is a lot 
17 A in excess of a half acre and was created prior to the 
18 effective date, and the parties stipulate, and the Court so 
19 orders that this doesn't bar building on this lot, that's 
20 what they really need-
21 I THE COURT: Okay. That would be fine. 
22 | MR* PARRY: My only concern, Jim, is I think it's le66 
23 | than a half acre, but (inaudible). 
24 | MR. WARD: It's ,53. 

























MR. PARRY: Well, that's over. 
MR. JARDINE: We agree it's over a half acre, so it's 
not an issue. 
MR. PARRY: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, fine. 
MR. JARDINE: (Inaudible). 
MR. HAGEN: It can't be less than (inaudible). 
MR. JARDINE: All right. Next, there has been an issue 
about conforming the legal description of the roadway 
easement in the Special Warranty Deed to actually reflect 
the— 
THE COURT: To the location. 
MR. JARDINE: —that—where it's actually located. And 
I think we're in agreement that that can be done. And I've 
made a—the one thing we didn't finally decide is, I've made 
a proposal that, since they're going to have a surveyor 
updating his survey, that they get the exact—have him 
include in his work the exact legal description of the road, 
and we'll bear the co6t of having the new deed prepared. 
Next, with regard to Brighton Corporation's waterline 
easement, which comes aero6s the property, the proposed 
resolution is that the claim of trespass and relocation 
would be dismissed, if everything else is resolved; that the 
24 8 parties would agree that there is an 18-foot easement for 
25 the waterline, but that Brighton Corporation can only have a 
11 
1 I waterline within that easement, no other utilities or other 
2 uses; and that the final order would specifically say that 
3 fl Brighton Corporation may go on Ward's property only to 
4 repair the—repair and maintain the line, and only upon 
5 | reasonable notice of when it intends to do so to Mr. Ward, 
6 | MR. PARRY: Written? 
7 | MR. JARDINE: Written? That's fine, it can be written. 
8 THE COURT: I'm assuming that that would exclude some 
9 | kind of emergency situation. A waterline— 
10 I MR. PARRY: Yeah. 
11 THE COURT: A waterline is something that can have a 
12 sudden break. 
13 | MR. JARDINE: I assumed that—my use of the word 
14 | •reasonable"— 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16 | MR. JARDINE: — I thought meant that if you have an 
17 | emergency, immediate dealing with it is reasonable— 
18 MR, PARRY: (Inaudible). 
19 MR. JARDINE: —and the only problem i6 that written 
20 U notice then makes that more difficult. Any problem with 
2i | having that clarification? 
22 MR- PARRY: No, that's a fine clarification. 
23 MR. JARDINE: In an emergency, we're able to deal with 
24 I it immediately. 



























MR. JARDINE: Further, we have agreed that within that 
18-foot easement, Ward may also locate his utilities, one or 
more of his utilities, if necessary, so long as the location 
of them and their relationship to the existing waterline 
meets all applicable regulations, ordinances, and codes. 
And further, that if any of Ward's utilities will cross the 
waterline, that Ward will provide, in advance of undertaking 
any such utility construction, to provide Brighton 
Corporation with its construction plans so that Brighton 
Corporation may determine whether the proposed plans may 
cause injury to Brighton Corporation's waterline. 
We want to state on the record what we've advised Mr. 
Parry—and I think he's agreeable—that it's recognized by 
the parties that this is a unique waterline, that it's a 
continuous, high-pressure, high-density, polyethylene line, 
with special compaction and layering construction, and that 
if it's crossed by any of—and also that it's sensitive to 
temperature—and that if it's crossed by Ward, one of Ward's 
utilities, that it will be completely restored to its 
compaction and all of the necessary conditions for the 
maintenance of the line, by Ward, and that—we want to state 
on the record that, because it's susceptible to injury, 
because it's a continuous line, a break and patch i6 not an 
adequate solution for this kind of line, as opposed to other 
kind6 of lines, so that great care needs to be taken with 
13 
1 (J respect to that, and so I think the fact that it would have 
2 U to comply with all applicable regulations, ordinances, and 
3 fj code, and we'd have a chance to review it in advance, would 
4 I be satisfactory to us. But it's a sensitive issue that I 
5 (J just want to note for the record, 
6 || I understand that if all of this is achieved and 
7 I accomplished and finally resolved, that all other claims 
8 | between the parties would be dismissed and that a final 
9 order would be entered with the Court, setting forth all of 
10 the terms of the settlement, attaching the plans, and that 
11 | giving the parties, giving Brighton Corporation reasonable 
12 I rights of inspection to ensure compliance in the 
13 I construction phase with the plans the Court has approved. 
14 And we can work—I'm just saying reasonable now, the 
15 | details of which, but, I mean, we're talking about notice 
16 and reasonable time and that sort of thing. 
17 THE COURT: All right, 
18 MR. JARDINE: I believe that states the agreement-
19 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Parry, you've heard the 
20 agreement, do you concur? 
2i MR. PARRY: (Inaudible). 
22 MR. JARDINE: Well, I mentioned it. 
23 MR. PARRY: Oh, did we you? Okay. 
24 MR. JARDINE: Let me just be clear, because I cited the 
25 I three exceptions. 
14 
l | MR- PARRY: That's r i g h t , t h a t ' s r i g h t - Okay. 
2 MR. JARDINE: Okay. 
3 A THE COURT: Keep your discussions audible to the 
4 record. 
5 ft MR- PARRY: Yeah. There are only two things, and one 
6 I of them just came up this morning, and that's to have an 
7 A architect sign. My understanding is to have a certified 
8 | engineer—that's the one who's going to really draw the site 
9 A plan—and I wanted to make sure that was no problem—a 
10 fi certified engineer on the site plan. 
11 MR. JARDINE: And— 
12 MR. PARRY: It's really not an architect's—you asked— 
13 I THE COURT: It's not an architect's drawing, right? 
14 MR. PARRY: That's right. 
15 | MR. JARDINE: Can I just ask just this question? 
16 fi THE COURT: Yes, certainly. 
17 I MR. JARDINE: We—this hasn't been discussed. 
18 UNIDENTIFIED: (Inaudible). 
19 MR. JARDINE: Let me just clarify this. Are you 
20 I talking about the site plan, without a rendering of the 
21 I cabin on it? 
22 MR- SHAW: No. The cabin ( i n a u d i b l e ) . 
23 | MR. JARDINE: Don't we need, any t ime the cab in ' s shown 
24 B on the s i t e p l a n , t o a l so have the—excuse me—to a l s o have 
25 I the a r c h i t e c t s i g n i t , 60 that he ' s c e r t i f y i n g where t h e 
15 
1 I  gr*de elevations are? 
2 || MR. SHAW: That wouldn't be a problem, 
3 MR- JARDINE: To have both? Okay. That's fine. 
4 I MR. PARRY: Your Honor, I don't know if you remember 
5 I  Mr- Kimball Shaw? 
6 THE COURT: Yes, I do remember. I've known Kimball 
7 Shaw a substantial period of his life. 
8 MR. PARRY: Oh. 
g THE COURT: We also have been members of the Virginia 
10 | Heights Tennis Club, where Mr. Shaw's father was somehow 
11 1 invested with the presidency for about a third of his life, 
12 but even there. So, I—but I'm not personally acquainted 
13 with Mr. Shaw, other than that. I wouldn't describe it as 
14 I social—it's casual. 
15 MR. JARDINE: Before you get to the calendar, I forget 
16 fi t w o other things, Your Honor, in trying to rush this. One 
17 fi of the issues is whether the road would be paved. It's our 
18 understanding that if this goes through, we would pave the 
19 road, at Brighton Corporation's expense. 
20 And we raised an issue, and it's one that we raised at 
2i | the end, and there's some confusion about it. So, thi6 is 
22 K more to get clarification. We think, at one point, a 
23 fi conditional use perroit was sought for thi6 building, which 
24 | we understand, maybe correctly or incorrectly, would permit 
























permitted use permit, and we'd like to just be clear. 
MR. PARRY: I think that's one of the statements in the 
letter. 
MR. JARDINE: So you're fine on that? 
MR. PARRY: So, we're (inaudible). Yeah. 
MR. JARDINE: I mean, I don't think we're in 
disagreement, because I don't think they intend to use 
anything—than as a family cabin, but we just need to be 
clear on that issue. Having stated those then, we're back 
to you. 
THE COURT: So you are clear on that, Mr. Parry, this 
(inaudible)? 
MR. PARRY: Yes, that my understanding was the county 
said, get a conditional use, a permitted use, you know, 
that's fine to put a cabin up there. 
THE COURT: Okay. There is no intent to use this at 
any time— 
MR. PARRY: As a bed and breakfast? 
THE COURT: —a6 a bed and breakfast? 
MR. PARRY: No, no. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
MR. PARRY: The only other thing—the only one thing 
2-3 | was where you were talking about determining the waterline. 
24 
25 
I just want it—made it clear to its prior condition. 
THE COURT: That's what they're expecting, ye6. 
17 
1 || MR. JARDINE: That's what I understand, yes. 
2 MR. PARRY: Yeah. It just was—it came out a little 
3 I differently. 
4 I  THE COURT: Okay. Now, you can go ahead, Mr. Parry. 
5 I MR. PARRY: Oh, yes. My only other thing is the time 
6 for trial, if necessary. I'm hoping that you'll have two 
7 | days sometime in late April or early May. 
8 I THE COURT: Well, let's talk about— 
9 | MR. PARRY: Hopefully, we won't need it, but— 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk about that. Let me ask 
11 I this—when would you be aware of whether you might want 
12 those days? How soon? 
13 MR. PARRY: Well— 
14 A THE COURT: Right before the trial? 
15 MR. PARRY: Right before. It's going to take about 30 
16 | days, this is what we're—that gives us a little leeway, but 
17 | 30 days to prepare the plans, to have an architect draw the 
18 I plans. Brighton has said that they would review them within 
19 seven days. What we're really up against is like a June 1st 
20 § building permit date. It takes about 30 days in the county. 
21 | So
 f we would like to be able to get these to the county by 
22 1 M aY 1#t' June is when the building season starts, and we'd 
23 | like to be ready to go by then. 
24 | THE COURT: Okay, 



























some sooner date, but we don't want to go through another 
building season. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll tell you what I will do. 
I'm anticipating whis to be a resolution of the case and, 
certainly, if it isn't, it's going to be an inconvenience to 
me, at that time, because in the interim I will have placed 
other matters on my calendar. 
MR. PARRY: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: And the only thing I will say now, why 
don't we just set a date for one of those times, so that 
we're all working upon the same page, but, hopefully, I 
guess, we'll not have to use it. I would say probably we 
ought to go to April 22"d. Is that convenient to both of 
your calendars? 
MR. PARRY: That'6 fine with mine. 
MR. JARDINE: Give me just one second, Your Honor. 
UNIDENTIFIED: (Inaudible). 
MR. JARDINE: Let me—I need to clarify something that 
I probably misstated. The checklist that I understand that 
Mr. Richardson and Mr. Shaw talked about, actually has some 
steps along the way, as I understood it. That is, that 
there are some things that you get before you get the final 
set of plans. Now, maybe I'm misunderstanding it, but if 
that's—that may or may not change the dates, but if we get 
J all of that in 6even days, that—I'm being told that may not 
19 
1 I  be adequate. Is that a correct understanding of the 
2 checklist? 
3 Jl MR- PARRY: The way, as I understood it, that Neil 
4 || Richardson had it, was that when he's working with a client, 
5 | they do it in stages. Most of those stages have been 
6 | accomplished. What needs to be done now is the final 
7 drawings are drawn. 
8 MR. JARDINE: All I'm—well, I (inaudible). 
9 MR. PARRY: Well, I'm not agreeing to the stages. 
10 THE COURT: What you're agreeing to is the final 
11 drawings will all be presented? 
12 MR. PARRY: That's correct. 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
14 I MR. PARRY: And it's, you know (inaudible). 
15 1 UNIDENTIFIED: (Inaudible). 
16 MR. JARDINE: I don't know what—I think—I would say 
17 | this, Your Honor, they're a little concerned that my saying 
18 if we get all the sets of plans at once, seven days may be 
19 slightly ambitious. 
20 THE COURT: Right. That' s — 
21 MR. JARDINE: We could have like 14, and I'd like to be 
22 honest with you, my client was just—had in mind—and I 
23 | think, sort of fairly, that they would see the 6ite plan 
24 H before they saw the final plan, which is sort of a staging 



























he wants to submit it all at once, there may be benefit in 
submitting— 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. JARDINE: —one of those first, but that's his 
call, not ours, but we will need maybe slightly more than 
seven days to review it. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm (inaudible). 
MR. PARRY: The (inaudible) last night. 
THE COURT: That's not going to create any problem if 
they're—if you have the plans within seven days from now. 
MR. PARRY: Oh, no, no, it'll—how long will it take 
you to do them? 
MR. SHAW: Well, the sub-plan would be the most 
important drawing, and that's actually a good idea to submit 
that as soon as possible and then continue (inaudible). 
MR. PARRY: Okay. One of the things we discussed last 
night, because we had the two architects together, was that 
really this was not going to be a "let's just pack up and 
leave each other and ignore each other for a month," but 
that they could be working together and making sure things 
are acceptable during this whole time period. I don't see 
it as just dumping a set of plans on them in 30 days. 
MR. JARDINE: I would say this, Your Honor, we're 
willing to review plans along the way, like the site plan/ 
J when we get them, and we turn then around in a reasonable 
21 
1 || time frame, and if we could have—if that happens— 
2 || THE COURT: How about not les6 that 14 days? 
3 I  MR. JARDINE: From the time we get the plans? Yes, 
4 MR. PARRY: That*s okay. 
5 THE COURT: On any plans that are submitted. That 
6 seems to be reasonable, and then don't just send them all at 
7 Bonce, send them as soon as they're done. 
8 | MR. PARRY: They'll certainly do that. 
9 THE COURT: Teah, okay. All right. 
10 MR. PARRY: The 22nd and 23rd is okay with us, Your 
11 Honor. 
12 THE COURT: April 22nd and 23rd? 
13 MR. JARDINE: Do you have a week later? No, no, that— 
14 I THE COURT: I have the 29th and 30th, but I have a 
15 & three-day jury trial starting on Wednesday the 28th. 
16 MR. PARRY: Kr. Shaw said that he could get them done 
17 A by the 7th, so that would give us 14 days. 
18 MR. JARDINE: I'll keep the 22nd or the 23rd, it was a 
19 (inaudible). 
20 j THE COURT: Well, I can go to May 6th or 7th. 
21 MR. JARDINE: I think they're worried about that 
22 I bumping into the 30 days they think it takes to get to the 
23 I county, 6 0 — 
24 | MR. PARRY: And since—yes, we're the one6 who are 
25 I asserting the pressure. We111 put pressure on getting the 
22 
1 jj plans done. 
2 I! THE COURT: Yeah. I might say, you've asserted 
3 | pressure for about three years, and you haven't been a part 
4 I of it, but I'm not any longer sensitive to your pressure on 
5 that, in that respect, because I've had enough of it. So— 
6 MR. PARRY: I was hoping that we wouldn't get into— 
7 THE COURT: Yeah. 
8 MR. PARRY: —those types of things. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. JARDINE: Let me a6k, Your Honor, we have— 
11 j THE COURT: Well, here's the problem. I have a three-
12 day jury trial set on the 28th, right now. It's a "96 case, 
13 I I don't know anything more than its number—I except it will 
14 1 go. 
15 MR. PARRY: We said we'd meet the 22nd, we'd meet that 
16 1 day. 
17 MR. JARDINE: I'm just getting a conflict here from Mr, 
18 Hagen. I would— 
19 THE COURT: That you have? 
20 MR- JARDINE: No, that we have for the 22nd. If there 
21 J was a chance we could—if you could—if we could call back 
22 and call the lawyers on that three-day trial and, if it 
23 I looks like it has a chance of settling, have the 29th and 
24 1 30th as a— 
25 I THE COURT: I ' l l g i v e you t h e 29 t h and 30 t h r i g h t now— 
23 
1 (( it's just that I may have to deal with it. 
2 || MR- JARDINE: I understand, Your Honor. I'm sorry, 
3 || it's a conflict with my client. 
4 || THE COURT: Okay. 
5 || MR. JARDINE: So, if we could hold that and we'll find 
6 out from Taunie who the (inaudible). 
7 THE COURT: Well, don't worry about that right now. I 
8 J don't want that. I mean, let them settle their own case. 
9 MR. JARDINE: All right. 
10 THE COURT: Your number is 94 anyway, so I would normal 
11 t rY it ahead of another one, except that this has been moved 
12 so many times, I may not have quite the sympathy that I 
13 might have had previously, and I don€t mean to be unkind 
14 about that. 
15 MR. PARRY: All right. 
16 THE COURT: Because I have now three days that are just 
17 given back to me, and I don't have another case in those 
18 three days, which is not very happy—you know, even though I 
19 might have other things to do, I do have plenty to do, but 
20 it's not a very happy thing to save those days for you and 
21 U gotten the other cases cleared out. Okay, that's enough, m 
22 that respect. 
23 Have you stated your stipulation to your satisfaction/ 
24 I Mr. Jardine? 
25 MR. JARDINE: I have. 
24 
1 II THE COURT: Mr, Parry, do you concur? 
2 MR- PARRY: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: All right. Let's have—who, on behalf of 
4 I Brighton Corporation, should be placed under oath? 
5 MR. JARDINE: Mrs. Barton. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Will you stand and raise your 
7 right hand, please? And, Mr- Ward, will you likewise stand 
8 and raise your right hand, please? 
9 | COURT CLERK: Do you and each of you solemnly swear the 
10 testimony you're about to give in the case before the Court 
11 will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
12 truth, so help you God? 
13 MRS. BARTON: Yes. 
14 J MR. WARD: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: All right. You€ve heard the statement of 
16 I the stipulation by your attorney and also by Mr. Parry. Do 
17 I y°u agree to the terms and conditions of this stipulation 
18 and agree to implement them? 
19 MRS. BARTON: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Likewise, you've heard the 
21 I statement of the stipulation now concurred and by all, 
22 | including Brighton Corporation. Do you agree to the terms 
23 I and conditions, of the stipulation and to implement them, 
24 I Mr. Ward? 
25 I ****•• WARD: Yes, yes. 
25 
THE COURT: Thank you each- All right, based then upon 
that stipulation, the Court will strike the trial date 
anticipating, hopefully, that the whole matter will be 
resolved upon this stipulation- The Court has continued a 
trial date, in anticipation that the matter will be 
resolved, however, to April 29th and 30th, if needed, for the 
trial. All right? 
MR- JARDINE: Thank you, Tour Honor-
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PARRY LAWRENCE & WARD 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re Brighton Corporation v Ward 
Dear Brent 
As I indicated to you in our telephone conversation of last week, Brighton Corporation has 
decided to make one last effort to resolve the ongoing dispute before proceeding to motions1 and trial in 
this case I will not repeat all of the issues that have built up and which are set out in prior letters, 
except to note that the recent discovery by Brighton Corporation that since April 1996 Mr Ward has 
been seeking approval from Salt Lake County Development Services not only for the Chalet Plan but 
also for the Designer and Cottage Plans, all of which are now on file at the County, has added to the 
skepticism of my clients 
On behalf of Brighton Corporation, we offer to resolve all issues and approve the Chalet Plan on 
the following principles 
1
 As I have indicated, and so there is no question, by proceeding with this proposal Bnghton Corporation is not abandoning or waiving 
in any way its position that it is entitled to have Mr Ward either have the plans signed and verified by an architect or reimburse 
Bnghton Corporation for its expenses and professional fees in reviewing further plans If we fail to reach agreement, then we will 
proceed to file our motion for partial summary jdugment that requiring verification by an architect and reimburement of reviewing 
expenses is reasonable. We are also considering including as a ground for that motion that consideration of the standards of the 
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1. We wish to resolve aH issues that now or may exist between these parties, so that to the 
fullest extent possible there is no risk of future litigation between them except with respect to 
compliance with the Court's Orders There should be no ambiguities or open issues in the final 
resolution. 
2. Any settlement must be fully and completely documented and incorporated in an order of 
the Court that includes all approved plans, with continuing jurisdiction in the Court to monitor 
compliance with the order and with a reasonable right in Brighton Corporation to inspect for 
compliance. 
In proposing this resolution, Brighton Corporation has considered and re-examined only the 
Chalet plans of June 3, 1998. Based on those plans, Brighton Corporation would give its approval and 
resolve this entire issue only if the following changes were made or conditions were met (most or all of 
which are not new). Brighton Corporation has highlighted points on the maps and site plans, copies of 
which are included, which must be removed, as well as inconsistencies in the plans that must be 
corrected 
1 FRONT PORCH ON NORTH 
We have repeatedly asked for detailed drawings of how Mr. Ward proposed to accomplish the 
design and placement of a porch on the north side of the cabin, as Brighton Corporation has been 
skeptical that it could be done. To date we have not received the requested detailed drawings. 
We do not believe that the entire north side of the cabin can be graded down to the 116' 
elevation shown on the topography map, so that the floor of the porch and the steps leading up to the 
porch can be placed lower than the first floor of the cabin, which has been agreed upon and set at 116' 
10." Cutting the mountainside down as much as five feet, then trying to hold it with a retaining wall on 
the east and grading away from the north side of the porch is not feasible. This is not placing the cabin 
into the slope of the mountain, but rather cutting down the mountain to fit in a porch. This is also 
important because of the very real potential impact on Brighton Corporation's waterline. 
Brighton Corporation has suggested that the cabin be entered from the east side of the cabin into 
the second floor, which, particularly in the winter, would provide an easy access to the cabin from the 
circular driveway and parking, or from the patio on the west side of the cabin. 
2. BRIGHTON CORPORATIONS WATERLINE AND EASEMENT 
The existence and present location of Brighton Corporation's waterline and easement must be 
confirmed so there is no future dispute about it. 
Brighton Corporation's waterline has never been moved, only lowered into the ground, and 
extended by Silver Lake Company to reach their new main line. Mr. Ward has shown Brighton 
Brent D. Ward, Esq. 
October 28, 1998 
Page 3 
Corporation's waterline in several different locations on different maps and site plans, none correctly 
Given these issues, Sneidman and Assoc, with the help of Steve Jorgenson, Silver Lake Company 
watermaster, prepared a survey in June 1994. As part of the resolution, the parties must agree on the 
accuracy of that survey, and Mr. Ward will remove any notations from any plans he has submitted or 
will submit to the County or other agencies questioning in any way the right or location of that 
easement. The notations made by Kirk Morgan of Sneidman & Assoc, and Steve Jorgenson, 
watermaster, are the only notes concerning Brighton Corporation's waterline that may appear on any 
site plan included with final plans. 
Finally, the proposed waterline to Mr. Ward's cabin must be located further south than Brighton 
Corporation's valve connection to the Silver Lake line. Mr. Ward must document the exact location of 
his waterline and valve, as directed or approved by Mr. Jorgenson. 
3. WARD/COATS SEWER LINE 
The words, "Brighton Corporation disputed sewer line placed Aug 1997 outside provided 
easement" is to be removed from all site plans. Brighton Corporation's sewer line was placed by 
Solitude Improvement District within the easement as shown on "Grant of Easement for Construction 
and Maintenance" dated May 6, 1994 
No provision was made in the Special Warranty Deed or Property Use Agreement for 
Ward/Coats utilities to be placed in the right-of-way running along Forest Alley (vacated). Dransfield's 
utilities are located in the north side of the easement, Brighton Corporation's sewer line on the south 
side, and the center portion is for utilities that will be installed on the property between Dransfield's and 
Brighton Corporation's at some future time. 
Mr. Ward's sewer line should be shown on site plans running along the west end of his property 
from the cabin to the main sewer connection on Prospect Ave. It thus would run beneath Brighton 
Corporation's waterline at one point only, and that should be at the west end of Brighton Corporation's 
waterline 
Mr. Ward will need to provide Brighton Corporation with a "Grant of Easement for 
Construction and Maintenance" issued by Solitude Improvement District to him, showing the exact 
location of his sewer line. 
4. PATIO 
In reviewing the proposed patio in the June 3, 1998 plans, Brighton Corporation understands the 
proposal to include a very substantial excavation of the ground on the south to accommodate the 
proposed patio. Brighton Corporation cannot approve such a disturbance to the land. 
Brent D. Ward, Esq. 
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Brighton Corporation does not approve 758 square feet of concrete, or almost 2/3 the size of 
the entire cabin, for a patio as proposed in your letter of June 3, 1998. Although the Special Warranty 
Deed specifically calls for decking, in the meeting of January 1997 in Neil Richardson's office, Brighton 
Corporation agreed to allow Greg to use a concrete patio rather than wood decking if the area on the 
south was cut down approximately one-third. That was discussed by the architects in order to avoid a 
deep cut of over eight feet in the mountain. Greg has not complied with his part of the agreement. 
The patio on the south of the cabin may be 25 X 12 feet, or 300 square feet. This would 
necessitate only a 4-5 foot high retaining wall, without grading the ground in any significant way, 
instead of an 8-9 foot high retaining wall. This amount would be in addition to the concrete patio on 
the west of the cabin which is shown as 29 feet X 10 feet, or 290 square feet. This is a total of 590 
square feet of cement patio, or half again the square footage of the cabin, plus 48 square feet of decking 
off the second floor. 
5. PARKING 
The site plan shows two proposed areas for parking located east of the circular driveway with 
the inaccurate note "existing parking." The proposed parking is located in the Buffer Zone, which may 
not be used for parking, as outlined in the Property Use Agreement. Parking must be on or west of the 
circular driveway 
6. SET OF EXTERIOR ELEVATION DRAWINGS AND ELEVATIONS 
Drawings of the front, rear, and both sides of the chalet cabin showing the relationship of the 
cabin to the existing topography of the land must be submitted to Brighton Corporation. These 
drawings are to be the same type of drawings that have been submitted with other plans delivered to 
Brighton Corporation in December 1993, March 1994, July 1995 and August 1995. We have not 
received the exterior elevation drawings with any of the Chalet plans, though we have asked for them 
several times. 
The drawings of the contour of the land should, of course, be the same as previous elevation 
drawings made by Kimble Shaw, but the position of the cabin will be different as the Chalet is built into 
the slope of the mountain with the upper surface of the first floor at 116' 10", and with no basement. 
As a result, the drawings will show the southeast corner of the upper surface of the first floor 7-8 
feet into the ground, the northeast corner 4-5 feet into the ground, with as little disturbance to the 
existing grade as possible. This would be in addition to the footings and crawl space which are under 
the first floor. We have agreed that the ceiling of the first floor of the cabin may be 9 feet in height if 
the first floor of the cabin is built on grade on the west and into the slope of the mountain. 
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7. TOPOGRAPHY MAP AND SURVEY 
As part of any final set of plans, Mr. Ward must include a copy of the original Francom 
Topography Map showing the 2' contour intervals across the south side of the property. As Francom 
did not include Brighton Corporation's waterline on the topography map, Mr. Ward should include the 
transparent copy of the Sneidman Survey in the exact scale as the topography map showing the 
relationship of Brighton Corporation's waterline, the circular driveway, buffer zone, and present parking 
area, which can be superimposed onto the topography map. 
A footprint of the cabin and patio should be drawn on the map using a dotted line or another 
method that does not obscure the contour lines on the map. 
8. ROADWAY 
As previously discussed, as part of the resolution, the legal description of the road should be 
changed to match the physical location of the road maintaining the 20' width. In addition, Brighton 
Corporation may proceed to asphalt the road for safety and emergency vehicle access. 
9 ADDITIONAL ITEMS 
a. There needs to be a clear definition of the meaning of the phrase, "construction grade 
116", which appears at numerous places in the plans. This is ambiguous. 
b. All necessary corrections should be made to Techni-Graphic Services sheets 1-5 for front 
porch, retaining walls, patio, doorways, etc. On sheet 5, the elevation of the patio should be given with 
the other elevations, and the height of the crawl space should be given as "36" maximum," instead of 
"36" min." 
c. Several corrections need to be made to the General Notes which are included as the last 
page of the plans. 
(i) The words "which is to be no higher than 36" should be added to #13, which 
refers to the crawl space. 
(ii) #37 reads: "Smoke detectors required at each bedroom, at hallways leading to 
bedrooms, at every floor level, at the top of each stairway on any floor without bedrooms, and 
in rooms serving bedrooms where the ceiling height of the room is 24" or more greater in height 
than the bedroom served from such room." As the cabin is to have only two floors with no loft 
or basement, and as your plans show one set of stairs and bedrooms on the 2nd floor only, this 
note is ambiguous and should be corrected. 
Brent D.Ward, Esq. 
October 28, 1998 
Page 6 
(iii) OTHER reads: 4CNo stumps, roots or vegetation shall be removed from the soil 
of B/C's waterline easement except as may be necessary for placement of utilities, water and 
sewer." The word 'organic material' should be added after the word "vegetation", and the 
words "except as may be necessary for placement of utilities, water and sewer" must be omitted. 
d. Brighton Corporation was not given a copy of the "Support Documents for Gregory M. 
Ward Cabin", which are attached to the Chalet Plans at Salt Lake County Development Services. Mr. 
Ward will need to correct each page of this document to bring it into conformity, and submit a copy to 
Brighton Corporation for approval. 
The first page, which is Mr. Ward's letter of August 18, 1998 to Development Services for 
Planning and Zoning, notes that he is enclosing (12) site plans showing electrical-water-sewer service 
on the property. At the present time there is no electrical, water, or sewer services on the property. 
This needs to be corrected or explained. 
The August 18 letter also indicates that he is enclosing two copies of the building plan 
elevations. We think these must have been the copies of the Cottage Plan elevations which we found in 
the file with the Chalet plans. The two sets of plans are not interchangeable for Brighton Corporation's 
review. 
In that letter, Greg also includes three maps to show "Drainage," "Course of Construction 
Fencing," and "Area of Ground Disturbance/Grading." Parking is shown in the two areas of the buffer 
zone. The position of the sewer line and water lines need to be corrected. Construction fencing must 
run the entire west side of the buffer zone and must run along the south side of Brighton Corporation's 
waterline easement except where the easement is across the circular driveway. The enclosed map 
showing ground disturbance/grading is highlighted in yellow showing those areas where there may not 
be any grading and which must experience as little disturbance as possible. 
It also appears that a "color board for exterior finish" was included with the Support Document 
subnriitted to the County August 18, 1998. Mr. Ward has not given Brighton Corporation this material, 
but as this is a part of the design of the cabin, this also needs to be submitted for approval to Brighton 
Corporation. In the past, we have indicated that this will likely not be an issue for Brighton 
Corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the drawings and documents requested must be furnished. Each item noted as incorrect 
must be remedied as outlined. All additions, deletions, and adjustments must be addressed and 
incorporated into a complete and truthful set of plans. After Mr. Ward has made the necessary 
corrections, Neil Richardson will be asked to verify them for accuracy. If approved we will prepare a 
settlement agreement based on the plans. Once the Court has entered an Order, Mr. Ward may then 
Brent D. Ward, Esq. 
October 28, 1998 
Page 7 
submit those Court-approved plans to Salt Lake County Development Services for a building permit in 
place of the three plans, which are now on file there. 
If the plans are not corrected in every detail as we have suggested, and all drawings and 
documents are not submitted as requested, approval cannot be given. 
We hope this proposal will result in a resolution. Given the history, Brighton Corporation does 
not want to negotiate these points. However, I certainly am willing to clarify any aspect of this letter. 
We look forward to hearing from you. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
A~Wames S. Jardine 
cc Sam Clark 
433379 
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February 22, 1999 
Douglas J Parry, Esq. 
PARRY, LAWRENCE & WARD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Brighton Corporation v. Ward 
Dear Doug: 
I am writing on behalf of Brighton Corporation in response to your letter of February 5, 
1999, and with respect to the plans that accompanied that letter. I also acknowledge our 
subsequent receipt of two additional drawings last week that you advised me are "corrected" 
drawings prepared by Kimble Shaw. Additionally, on February 18, 1999, we received an 
additional 13 (thirteen) pages of plans that we understand are a duplicate of the plans already 
provided on February 5, with red dots marking your ameliorative changes, along with an 
accompanying letter of explanation. Brighton Corporation has carefully reviewed the plans 
signed by Kimble Shaw and consulted with Neil Richardson, a licensed architect, and has 
directed me to respond on its behalf. For the reasons set out below, Brighton Corporation does 
not approve these plans. 
1. The Plans are Incomplete and Lack Necessary Detail. The plans do not comply 
with the Court's grant of Brighton Corporation's recent motion for partial summary judgment. 
The Court's order provides that Brighton Corporation may require, as a condition of further 
review, that the plans be signed by a licensed architect. The plans Brighton Corporation received 
include only three drawings signed by Kimble Shaw and those three drawings contain little of 
^PUUNTI^«XHIBI 
I EXHtBTTMO. ^ • 
I CASE HO. 
Douglas J. Parry 
February 22, 1999 
Page 2 
the detail Brighton Corporation needs to remove the ambiguity from the plans. Although you 
have objected that there is not enough time for Shaw to prepare a complete set of plans, this 
requirement was first imposed in a letter dated June 10, 1998, and was verbally requested long 
before then. In fact, it was initially suggested by Judge Young approximately one year ago. 
The plans that were prepared and signed by Kimble Shaw are not sufficiently detailed for 
Brighton Corporation to determine whether they are acceptable. For example, Brighton 
Corporation has consistently requested that Ward provide a site plan with contour lines that are 
clearly labeled with correct elevations. The site plan should include the exact elevation of each 
outside corner of the structure (including the base of retaining walls and footings). Elevation 
drawings must also include exact elevations for each outside corner. Moreover, the elevation 
drawings must include the architect's rendering of how the building fits into the existing grade 
on all four sides. The heavy black line on the elevations signed by Shaw is insufficiently 
detailed for Brighton to make its determination. The original plans considered by the Court in 
September 1994 showed how the cabin would fit into the existing landscape. These elevations 
do not include that detail and for those reasons, among others, the submitted plans are 
unacceptable. 
2. The Plans do not Adequately Clarify the North Porch. The plans do not show 
how a porch and the main entrance can be placed on the north side of the building without an 
excessive cut in the mountain and disturbance to Brighton Corporation's wateriine and wateriine 
easement. This issue is complicated by Ward's failure to submit plans that are sufficiently 
detailed. The lack of contour lines and exact elevations, as well as the failure to include a 
drawing showing how the porch and entryway fit into existing grade, makes it impossible for 
Brighton Corporation to determine whether the structure will disturb its wateriine. This issue has 
been discussed in several letters in the past. It is critical that Kimble Shaw address this issue 
with a detailed and specific drawing. 
Brighton Corporation continues to believe that the entrance should be moved to the east 
side of the cabin at the second floor level or to the patio on the west side. Either option avoids 
the difficulties caused by trying to force a north-side entrance. 
3. The Patio on the South Side may require an Excessive Cut. The patio on the 
south and west sides of the cabin is too large and may require an excessive cut in the mountain. 
Brighton Corporation does not approve 758 square feet of concrete, or almost 2/3 the size of the 
entire cabin, for a patio as stated in your plans. The Special Warranty Deed calls for decking, 
not a concrete patio. In January 1997, the architects discussed reducing the size of the patio by 
one-third in the southeast corner in order to reduce the size of the retaining wall that would be 
required in the southeast corner. The plans ignore this consensus. Moreover, Kimble Shaw's 
drawings do not address the patio in any detail. As with the porch on the north side, this 
prevents Brighton Corporation from being able to determine whether the cut in the mountain is 
excessive. A retaining wall of more than six feet would violate the standards set out in the 
Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone. Brighton Corporation suggests now, as it has in the past, 
Douglas J. Parry 
February 22, 1999 
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that the patio on the south be reduced from 39 x 12 to 25 x 12, which would necessitate a much 
smaller cut in the mountain and still provide for a very sizeable patio In the alternative, the 
patio could be stepped down as it runs west along the south side of the cabin 
As Brighton Corporation has indicated many times, detailed and complete plans signed 
by an architect are necessary to avoid any further disputes should acceptable plans ultimately be 
approved by Brighton Corporation Such plans would then be available for inclusion in a court 
order and for clear and objective compliance and enforcement thereof. 
Brighton Corporation did not review all of the drawings submitted In keeping with our 
prior motion and the Court's direction, Brighton reviewed only those drawings signed by Mr. 
Shaw. For the reasons stated above, those drawings are not acceptable to Brighton Corporation. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
V^ James S Jardine 
cc Brighton Corporation 
451275 
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DEER CREST 
INITIAL PRELIMINARY PLAN CHECK LIST 





Lot or Parcel Number_ 
Address of Property 
Number Area Code 
Home Ph 
Number 
Please provide the following sheets tor design review 




1 Licensed Surveyor 
a Name 
b License No 
Licensed Landscape Architect 
a Name 
b License No 
Scale r = 20'-0" 











2'-0" - Contours 
Natural Site Featureb 
Existing Vegetation 
Scheduled visit by design review committee 







Date ot Scheduled Visit 
e Plan 
Scale r = 20'-0H 
She >w dwelling coverage 
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Show other impervious coverage 
Dwelling SF* Impervious Coverage SF_ 
•(Footprint with eaves, overhangs, outbuildings) 
QI Sheet 3 - Grading/Drainage Plan 
A. Scale 1" = 20' -0"-
Included Missing 
D D 






1 Provide the following names 




















2 Attach Soils Engineer's report on your lot • 
Plan Must Include 
1 Existing and proposed Contours • 
l2'-0" intervals) 
3 Fini-sh Pad Elevation • 
4 Slopes with top and bottom elevations • 
5 Surrace and sub-surface drainage with D 
top ot grade and invert elevauons 
6 Retaining walls with top and bottom D 














7 Locations and mountings for site 
objects, planters, accessory buildings 
and walls 
8 Surface drainage or paved areas sloped 
as per UBC standards 
9 Surface drainage ot landscape and planted 
swales slope to 
10 Lots unable to meet minimum surface 







drainage system (See Design Guidelines) 
IV Sheet 4 - Landscape Plan 







B Plan must include 
1 List of new plant materials 
2 Site and location of plant materials 
3 Areas shown to be irrigated by spray 
s f. of spray I \,&& ~> f^ A/"A V 
4 Areas shown to be ungated by dnp 
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VI Sheets 6 - 7 - Site Cross Sections (Minimum of two) 





B Plan must include 
1 Height allowed above natural grade b\ 
Deer Crest Desizn Guidelines 
Maximum heismt ot structure- trom to 
VII Sheets 8 - 14 - Schematic Architectural Drawings 
A Scale ' / / = l'-0" • 
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Deer Crest Associates, I, L.C LCC Properties Group, L . C 136 Heber Avenue, Suite 308, Park City, Utah 84060 
Contact: Renee Norstrom Phone No . (435) 655-8822 FAX: (435) 655-8120 
DEER CREST 
CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENT CHECK LIST 
Property Owner's Name 
Mailing Address 
Area Code Number Area Code Number 
Business Ph. - - Home Ph. 
FAX No. -
Lot or Parcel Number 
Address of Property 
Please provide the following sheets for design review 
I. Sheet 1 - Existing Conditions 
A. Scale 1" = 20'-0" 
Plan must include-
1. 2'-0" - Contours 
2. Natural Site Features 
3 Existing Vegetation 
II Sheet 2 - Site Plan 
A. Scale 1" = 20'-0" 
B. Show dwelling coverage 
B. Show other impervious coverage 
D. Dwelling SF* Impervious Coverage SF 
•(Footprint with eaves, overhangs, outbuildings) 
III. Sheet 3 - Grading/Drainage Plan 
A. Scale 1" = 20'-0M-
I. Attach Soils Engineer's report on your lot 
B. Plan Must Include 


























I. Existing and proposed Contours 
(2'-0M intervals) 
3. Finish Pad Elevation 
4. Slopes with top and bottom elevations 
5. Surface and sub-surface drainage with 
top of grade and invert elevations 
6. Retaining walls with top and bottom 











7. Locations and mountings for site 
objects, planters, accessory buildings 
and walls. 
Surface drainage or paved areas sloped 
as per UBC standards 
Surface drainage of landscape and planted 





10. Lots unable to meet minimum surface 
drainage systems must use a sub-surface 
drainage system (See Design Guidelines) 
Sheet 4 - Landscape Plan 
A. Scale P = 20*-0" 





List of new plant materials 
Site and location of plant materials 
Areas shown to be irrigated by spray M A / 
s.f. of spray / (*OD *??=-
Areas shown to be ungated by, drip 
s.f. of drip area 4 flpg *7T • ^ yy^A . 
C. Irrigation Plan 
D. Landscape Lighting 
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VI. Sheets 6 - 7 - Site Cross Sections (Minimum of two) 










Plan must include. 
1. Height allowed above natural grade by 
Deer Crest Design Guideiines (Show) 
Maximum height of structure- from_ to 
Sheets 8 - 14 - Construction Documents Complete 
for Construction 
Scale %"= l'-O" A. 
B. Plans must include the following-
I. Allowable building s.f per Deer Crest Design Guidelines 















Sections and Details 
Materials List 
Location of Material 
Elevations 
Written Specifications 
Material Sample Board 
Colored Elevations or Renderings 
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Construction Information Submittal 
Insurance 
Requirement not less than $1,000,000 00 
a) This insurance shall not be canceled, limited m scope of coverage or non-renewed until thirtv davs wntten 
notice has been given to the Deer Crest Master Association 
b) This insurance policy, which names the Deer Crest Master Association as an additional msured is pnmarv 
and anv insurance maintained bv such additional msured shall be non-contnbutmg 
Submitted Not Submitted 
Insurance Policy Certificate • D 
Policy Amount $1,000,000 00 required 
Coverage Dates From to_ 
Name Insured 









2 Copy of Comments trom Municipality Review 
3 Site Access Plan 
4 Fire Plan 
a The builder shall provide at least one high-capacitv 20 lb chemical fire 
extinguisher to be located near flammable matenals storage areas and 
on each floor level under construction 
b The builder shall maintain the truck within 200 teet of the structure D D 
under construction The Builder shall be reponsible to assure that the 
truck remains operation m winter bv using heat tape, glvcol or other 
Ireeze prevention methods The lire truck shall be tested daily and a 
record ot the test results shall be maintained on each lot for inspection 
purposes (See Daily FireTruck Test Report) • D 
c Certificate ot training The building superintendent or other key D C 
construction personnel shall be trained in the operation of the fire truck 
valves, hydrants and fire extinguishers 
d Record of Weekly Fire Dnll Fire dnlls will be conducted weekly to D D 
ensure tamihanty with fire control procedures and to assure that all 
all fire protection equipment is operational (Weekly Fire Dnll Report) 
e The Builder will post the phone number of the Wasatch Co Fire Dept on D D 
all fire extinguishers Anv fires will be reported immediately by 
Builder's onsite personnel, and any violations of fire control plan 
standard* Anv fire related incidents will also be reported to Deer Crest 
Associates, I L C 
5. Copy of Building Permit Q D 
6 Limits of Disturbance Fencing • D 
7 Evidence of Sufficient Funds Q Q 
































































Deer Crest Builder Guidelines & Requirements 
1 Site Access 
2 Staging 
3 Fire/Saiety 
4 Quality Assurance 
5 Deer Crest Requirements During Construction 
During construcUon the owner shall cause his Builder to conform to the following 
• Builder shall satisfy all requirements ot Wasatch County Mumcipal Code and those requirements 
ot the applicable governmental and private agencies for the hook-up ot water, power and any 
temporary use ot such services 
• Portable chemical toilet laciliUes and construcUon trash containers must be in place on the site, at 
an approved locaUon, at the time construction work is commenced These tacihues shall be 
regularly emptied and serviced at not less than twice weekly mtervals Such facilities must be 
removed when construcUon is completed, or li construcUon is halted for more man 30 davs 
• No construction work mav start betore 7 00 a m or continue after 7 00 p m No construction 
work is to be allowed on Sundays or on naUonally recognized legal holidays 
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• All noise abatement laws of Wasatch Countv or the DRC will be adhered to during construction 
• All deliveries, loadmg/unloadmg and hauling will conform to the hours ol operation between 
7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m 
• All hauling routes and load protections required under Wasatch Countv Municipal Code will be 
strictly adhered to and monitored bv the construction site superintendent 
• Construction site vehicles, equipment and employee vehicles will park within the construction 
site 
• No loose dogs or anv other pets of workers are permitted on site 
• Litter and trash on site must be controlled and properly disposed ol 
• The construction site should be securelv lenced and maintained in conformance with Wasatch 
Countv Municipal Code, so as not impact the adjacent area* 




Letter ot Certiiication O G 
11 Copv ot Anv Red Tags by Municipality Q Q 
12 Final Inspection Q Q 
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ROBERT P. HILL (A1492) 
SCOTT A. HAGEN (A4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South Main Street, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION, a Utah ORDER DENYING APPLICATION 
corporation, FOR DETERMINATION THAT 
CONSENT HAS BEEN 
Plaintiff, UNREASONABLY WITHHELD 
v. 
ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of : 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated December 
10, 1985, GREGORY M. WARD, an 
individual, DOUG'S TREE SERVICE, Civil No. 940905453 
INC., a Utah corporation, and : 
UNKNOWN PERSONS designated as Judge David S. Young 
JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, : 
Defendants. : 
—ooOoo— 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on July 13, 1995. At issue was 
defendant Gregory Ward's ("Ward") Application for Determination that Consent Has Been 
Unreasonably Withheld ("Application"). James S. Jardine and Scott A. Hagen appeared as 
00467 
counsel for Brighton Corporation. David M. Connors appeared as counsel for Ward. Prior 
to the hearing, the Court received and reviewed Ward's Application and memorandum in 
support (along with exhibits), plaintiffs memorandum in opposition, and Ward's reply 
memorandum in support. At the hearing, the Court heard testimony from Ward and from 
Neil Richardson, plaintiffs architect. 
Based on the papers submitted by counsel and the testimony and exhibits presented at 
the hearing, the Court finds that the plans submitted by Ward for approval by Brighton 
Corporation do not adequately comply with the restrictive covenants of the special warranty 
deed or this court's previous order granting preliminary injunction. The Court therefore 
concludes that Brighton Corporation did not act unreasonably in rejecting the plans. 
Accordingly, the Court denies Ward's Application for Determination that Consent Has 
Been Unreasonably Withheld. 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
DENYING APPUCATION FOR DETERMINATION THAT CONSENT HAS BEEN 
UNREASONABLY WITHHELD was hand-delivered on this _£f/day of August, 1995 to 
the following: 
David M. Connors 
Kenneth J. Sheppard 
Kevin C. Marcoux 
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE 
136 South Main, Suite 1000 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHTON CORP., : COURT%S RULING 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 940905453 
vs. : 
ISABEL M. COATS, : 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter was referred by the assigned Judge 
to the Presiding Judge, after the former denied recusal, 
determining that petitioner's affidavit of bias and prejudice was 
legally insufficient. This referral has been handled in accordance 
with Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 63(b) governs 
mandatory disqualification and does not relate to discretionary 
recusal by the challenged judge. See, State v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 
1091, 1094-95 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court: has interpreted 
the corresponding rule of criminal procedure, Rule 29, to require 
a showing of actual bias before disqualification is mandated. Id. ; 
see also. State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925-26 (Utah App. 1990). 
Consequently, petitioner's affidavit of bias and prejudice must 
establish actual bias before disqualification of the assigned judge 
is required. 
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The Affidavit herein alleges that the affiant "believes" the 
assigned Judge may be biased because opposing counsel (and other 
members of his firm) were listed along with some 75-100 other 
individuals in a pre-election ad (from the fall of 1996) supporting 
the retention of the assigned Judge. A mere conclusory opinion or 
belief that the assigned judge is or may be biased is insufficient 
for recusal, unless the belief is based on facts demonstrating bias 
in fact. 
Affiant has not stated, in the Affidavit or in accompanying 
Motion to Recuse or Memorandum in Support, any facts supportive of 
actual bias. An unsupported "concern about possible impartiality" 
is legally insufficient for a recusal. 
Additionally, Rule 63(b) requires that an affidavit ". . .be 
filed as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or 
such bias or prejudice is known." It would appear that petitioner 
knew of the circumstances underlying this claim of alleged bias, in 
October or early November of 1996, and has done nothing until the 
Motion was filed on May 16, 1997. This significant delay is noted 
and appears inconsistent with a sincerely held belief in the 
existence of either actual bias or the appearance of bias or 
impropriety. 
00719 
BRIGHTON V. COATS PAGE THREE COURT'S RULING 
For the foregoing reasons recusal is denied. This matter is 
referred back to the assigned judge for further proceedings and 
disposition. 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
PRESIDING JUDGE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
00720 
BRIGHTON V. COATS PAGE FOUR COURT'S RULING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this day of 
, 1997: 
James S. Jardine 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
79 S. Main, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
David M. Connors 
Attorney for Defendant 
136 s. Main, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #500 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
(801)532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
WAR a 2 ;::2 
^f COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
—ooOoo— 




ISABEL M COATS and WALTER M 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of the 
Isabel M Coats Trust dated December 10, 
1985, GREGORY M WARD, an individual, 
DOUG'S TREE SERVICE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and UNKNOWN PERSONS 
designated as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
—ooOoo— 
Plaintiff Brighton Corporation's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing at 8:30 a.m on January 22, 1999 before the Honorable David S. Young. James S. 
Jardine and Scott A. Hagen appeared as counsel for plaintiff Brighton Corporation. Douglas J. 
ons 
Parry appeared as counsel for defendant Gregory M Ward Having reviewed the legal 
memoranda, including exhibits, submitted by counsel for both parties, having heard oral 
argument from counsel, and deeming itself fully advised in the premises, 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Brighton Corporation's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is GRANTED as follows 
1. It is reasonable for Brighton Corporation, as a condition of reviewing future 
proposed plans submitted by defendant Ward, to require reimbursement of legal and professional 
fees and costs incurred as part of that review However, Mr Ward may challenge the 
reasonableness of such fees and costs at trial If it is found at trial that the amount charged and 
paid is reasonable, then Brighton Corporation may keep the fees and costs paid 
2 It is reasonable for Brighton Corporation, as a condition of reviewing any plans 
from Mr Ward, to require that the plans be signed by a licensed architect 
3 In reviewing plans submitted by Mr Ward, it is reasonable for Brighton 
Corporation to apply the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone ordinance ("FCOZ") of Salt Lake 
County to Ward's proposed plans for comparison However, to the extent FCOZ contains a one-
acre minimum lot size, the parties have stipulated that the provision shall not apply At trial, 
Mr Ward may challenge the reasonableness of specific provisions of FCOZ applied by Brighton 
in reviewing the plans 




Approved as to Form 
Douglas J. Parry 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered on this ^ ^~ day of 
February, 1999 to the following: 
Douglas J. Parry 
PARRY, LAWRENCE & WARD 
60 East South Temple, #1270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 





Douglas J. Parry, Esq. (#2531) 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3434 
Attorneys for Defendant Gregory M. Ward 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 




ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated December 
10, 1985, GREGORY M. WARD, an 
individual, DOUG'S TREE SERVICE, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
UNKNOWN PERSONS designated as 
JOHN DOES NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS J. PARRY 
IN SUPPORT OF GREGORY M. 
WARD'S PETITION FOR 
EMERGENCY EXTRAORDINARY 
WRIT DIRECTED TO JUDGE DAVID 
S. YOUNG, THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH } 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
I, Douglas J. Parry, state under oath as follows: 
1. 1 am over the age of 18, am legal counsel for the Defendant Gregory 
M. Ward in Case No. 940905453, currently pending before Judge David S. Young in the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and have personal knowledge of 
the matters set forth below. 
2. On December 22, 1998, I was served with a motion for partial 
summary judgment filed by the plaintiff in this action. In that motion, the plaintiff requested 
the Court to rule as a matter of law on the following three issues: 
(i) That Greg Ward must compensate Brighton for all further costs 
associated with any review by Brighton of any plans submitted by Greg Ward, including 
attorney's fees incurred by Brighton. 
(ii) That any plans submitted by Greg Ward be approved by a 
licensed architect. 
(iii) That Brighton could consider the Foothills and Canyons Overlay 
Zone ordinance ("FCOZ") in reviewing any plans submitted by Greg Ward. 
None of these restrictions or requirements are contained in the Special 
Warranty Deed or Property Use Agreement. 
3. On December 23, 1998, the day after the plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment was filed, the Court held a scheduling conference. I attended that 
scheduling conference on behalf of the defendant Greg Ward. At the scheduling conference, 
the plaintiff advised the Court of the motion for partial summary judgment that had been 
filed the day earlier. The Court had not yet reviewed the motion, and I had not yet had any 
opportunity to oppose the motion. Nevertheless, the Court informed counsel for both parties 
that the Court was inclined to grant the motion for partial summary judgment. 
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4. I objected to the Court's comments, stating that I had just been served 
with the motion and would like the opportunity to address the motion before the Court made 
a decision concerning the motion. The Court responded by telling me that I could go ahead 
and file an opposition, but that the Court was nevertheless inclined to grant the motion. It 
was clear from the Court's statements to me that the Court had decided at that point to grant 
the motion for partial summary judgment and that any opposition that I might file would be 
futile. 
5. I filed an opposition to the motion and a hearing on the motion was 
held on January 22, 1999. The Court granted the motion for partial summary judgment 
during the January 22, 1999 hearing. 
6. As a result of the partial summary judgment, the Defendant Greg Ward 
is required to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs of plaintiffs architect's review of 
any plans that Ward submits for the construction of his cabin. On July 28, 1999, counsel for 
Brighton Corporation submitted a bill to Ward in the amount of $5,446.50 for Brighton's 
counsel's review of plans submitted by Ward. A copy of this bill is attached hereto. 
7. In addition, the Court is requiring Ward to incur the additional expense 
of having a licensed architect sign any plans submitted by Ward, which in turn required that 
Ward pay a licensed architect to redraft the plans already submitted so that the architect's 
signature could be attached. 
8. There is no requirement in the Special Warranty Deed that Ward pay 
any fees and costs associated with Brighton's review of plans. There is no requirement in 
3 
the Special Warranty Deed that plans submitted by Ward be drawn and signed by a licensed 
architect. The imposition of these requirement by the Court makes it difficult for Ward to 
submit plans to Brighton as a result of the excessive costs created by the Court's order. 
9. I attended another scheduling conference held in this case on September 
8, 1999. 
10. At the time of the scheduling conference, I was not aware that a few 
days earlier the plaintiff had filed a motion for an order allowing pavement of the roadway 
across the defendant's property in contravention of the express terms of the Property Use 
Agreement between the parties which requires that the road remain gravel. 
11. At the scheduling conference, the plaintiff informed the Court that it 
had filed the motion a few days earlier. The Court granted the motion for an order allowing 
pavement of the roadway over my objection and despite the fact that the defendant had not 
had notice or an opportunity to be heard on the matter. 
12. I did not receive the motion until after the scheduling conference. The 
certificate of service accompanying the motion claims that the motion was served by mail on 
Friday, September 3, 1999. Because Monday, September 6, 1999 was Labor Day, there was 
no mail service on that day, meaning that it would have been impossible for the motion to 
reach my office until September 7 or 8, 1999. 
13. The plaintiff filed a proposed order allowing the pavement of the 
roadway. I filed timely objections to the proposed order, including an objection that Mr. 
Ward's right to due process was violated by the Court's granting the motion without 
4 
providing Mr. Ward any notice or any opportunity to be heard. The Court denied my 
objections and entered the order on September 21, 1999. 
14. Plaintiffs counsel recently telephoned me to request permission for the 
plaintiff to cut down a tree on the defendant's property associated with the pavement of the 
roadway. I informed plaintiffs counsel that the defendant did not agree to the request and 
would not allow any trees on his property to be cut down. 
DATED this J£_ day of September, 1999. 
D O U G L ^ ^ P A ^ T 
SUBSCRIBED, ACKNOWLEDGED AND SWORN TO before me this 3d><& 
day of September, 1999. 
\ £ § M ^ ^ a ^ f t ^ ' NOTARY PUBLIC 
|^ *^*W 7 January 22.2000 | 
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STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
for 
BRIGHTON CORPORATION 
c/o MARY BARTON 
2661 ST. MARY'S WAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84108 
Greg Ward 
c/o Douglas Parry 
PARRY, ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
02/08/99 Draft and revise letter to D Parry, review plans S Hagen 
received from same, meeting with J S Jardine, 
meeting with M Barton regarding plans, telephone 
conference with S Clark regarding plans, letter to D 
Parry 
02/11/99 Review letter from D Parry, revise and send letter 
from J S Jardine to Parry 
02/12/99 Review new plans, meet with M Barton, read 
materials received from M Barton 
02/17/99 Review plans, draft rejection letter to D Parry, 
conference with M Barton 
02/18/99 Telephone conference with D Parry regarding 
issues for trial and additional plans 
02/19/99 Meeting with N Rjchardson and clients, revise letter 
to D Parry rejecting plans 
02/19/99 Meeting with M Barton, Clarks, N Richardson 
02/22/99 Revise letter to D Parry rejecting plans 
02/22/99 Discussions with S Hagen, review letter, filings, 
attend Pretrial Conference, draft outline of Trial 
Brief 
04/12/99 Review plans, brief meeting with M Barton 
04/13/99 Revise and mail letter to D Parry 
04/14/99 Message to N Richardson, draft letter to N 
Richardson 
04/15/99 Draft and revise letter to D Parry, read transcript S Hagen 
regarding agreement in court 



































04/15/99 Discussion with S Hagen, edit letter 
04/16/99 Telephone conference with M Barton regarding 
letter, telephone conference with D Parry regarding 
response to letter 
04/19/99 Telephone conference with S Clark regarding 
appointment with N Richardson 
04/21/99 Prepare for and attend meeting at N Richardson 
office, begin preparing letter to N Richardson 
04/22/99 Review letters and transcript for letter to N 
Richardson, draft and send letter 
04/23/99 Meet with M Barton regarding Ward's plans 
04/28/99 Telephone conference with M Barton regarding 
instructions to N Richardson 
04/29/99 Begin drafting additional letter to N Richardson, 
telephone conference with M Barton regarding 
same 
04/30/99 Letter to M Barton regarding permitted uses, revise 
letter to N Richardson, telephone conference with 
M Barton regarding Monday meeting 
05/03/99 Finish draft of letter to N Richardson, fax to S 
Clark for review, draft letter to M Barton regarding 
permitted uses 
05/04/99 Telephone conference with M Barton regarding 
letter to N Richardson 
05/13/99 Telephone conference with N Richardson's office 
05/17/99 Read Richardson report, review plans, telephone 
conference with S Clark 
05/17/99 Review Richardson letter, discussion with S Clark 
05/18/99 Letter to D Parry regarding Richardson report, 
telephone conference with M Barton regarding 
same, meeting with M Barton regarding same 
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James S. Jardine (1647) 
Scott A. Hagen (4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main. #500 
P. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
(801)532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By. 
FHLEO DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judical District 
^ — *• • „ M i i 
SALtt*«^OUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 




ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated 
December 10. 1985. GREGORY M. 
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE 
SERVICE. INC., a Utah corporation, 
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated 
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10. 
Defendants. 
ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO 
PAVE PRIVATE ROADWAY 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
This matter came on for a pretrial conference before the Honorable David S. Young on 
September 8, 1999. James S. Jardine and Scott A. Hagen appeared as counsel for Plaintiff 
0:392 
Brighton Corporation. Douglas J. Parry appeared as counsel on behalf of Defendant Gregory 
Ward. During the conference, counsel for the parties discussed Brighton Corporation's request 
to pave the existing dirt roadway that crosses Defendant Gregory Ward's property, pursuant to 
a recorded easement, and leads to Brighton's property. The parties discussed the location of 
the roadway, the parties' agreement to amend the legal description of the recorded easement to 
include the physical location of the road, and Ward's objection that Brighton should only be 
allowed to pave the roadway if it moves its waterline from its present location into the 
roadway. 
The Court, having determined that the waterline is placed within a separate easement 
and that paving the roadway would promote safety and not increase the burden on Ward's 
property, concluded that Brighton's request for paving the roadway was reasonable. The 
Court further determined that the paving should proceed immediately because of the 
approaching winter season. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Brighton Corporation may 
immediately proceed to pave the existing private roadway. 
DATED this JI day of September, 1999. 
2 OlSftS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ALLOWING 
PLAINTIFF TO PAVE PRIVATE ROADWAY was hand-delivered, on this °\ day of 
ry, Esq. 
TM\. 
ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
jasi South Temple, #1270 
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Exhibit L 
James S. Jardine (1647) 
Scott A. Hagen (4840) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #500 
P. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
(801) 532-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 




ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated 
December 10, 1985, GREGORY M. 
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE 
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated 
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING BRIGHTON'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff Bnghton Corporation's ("Brighton") Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
came before the Court for hearing on October 22, 1999. James S. Jardine and Scott A. Hagen 
appeared as counsel on behalf of behalf of Bnghton Corporation. Douglas J. Parry and James 
K. Tracy appeared as counsel on behalf of Defendant Gregory M. Ward. 
•UED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
'3 -399 
"S^LT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Ctoffc 
01417 
Based on the legal memoranda, including exhibits, filed by both parties in support of 
their respective positions, and based on oral argument presented by counsel for both parties, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. the stipulation stated by counsel on the record on March 3, 1999 and affirmed by 
the parties under oath, including the documents referenced in that oral stipulation, comprise a 
binding and enforceable contract which is binding on the parties. 
2. That contract sets forth the criteria for Mr. Ward's submission of plans to Brighton 
Corporation and Brighton Corporation's review of plans submitted by Mr. Ward. 
3. Accordingly, the issue to be decided at trial on November 17, and 18, 1999, is 
whether the plans submitted by Mr. Ward after the hearing on March 3, 1999 complied with 
the criteria stated in the March 3, 1999 stipulation and incorporated letters. 
4. Based on the foregoing, Brighton Corporation's Motion to Enforce Settlement is 
hereby granted. 
DATED this <D day ofJ>aeberrT999. 
BY THE COU 
Hon. David 
District Cou 
Approved as to form: 
James K. 
n« / 1 Q 
Exhibit M 
ames S. Jardine (1647) 
Scott A. Hagen (4840) 
IAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main, #500 
?. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
[801) 532-1500 
attorneys for Plaintiff 
By 
Third .'uc'icial District 
\-jT SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Depiny Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 




ISABEL M. COATS and WALTER M. 
COATS, individually and as Trustees of 
the Isabel M. Coats Trust dated 
December 10, 1985, GREGORY M. 
WARD, an individual, DOUG'S TREE 
SERVICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and UNKNOWN PERSONS designated 
as JOHN DOE NO. 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 940905453 
Judge David S. Young 
This matter came before the Court for bench trial on November 17, 18 and 19, 1999, 
the Honorable David S. Young presiding. The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses 
and examined the exhibits presented by Plaintiff Brighton Corporation and Defendant Gregory 
M. Ward, now issues the following order, which incorporates the Court's findings of fact. 
01C90 
1. The parties have entered into a binding settlement agreement that is comprised 
of (a) the transcript of hearing dated March 3, 1999, (b) the letter dated October 28, 1998 from 
James S. Jardine to Brent D. Ward, (c) the letter dated February 22, 1999 from James S. 
Jardine to Douglas J. Parry, and (d) two checklists made up of (i) the "Initial Preliminary Plan 
Checklist" and (ii) the "Construction Document Checklist." The checklists are the first six 
pages of trial exhibit 4-p. The terms of the settlement are stated in those documents, except 
that there are three exceptions to application of the Checklists as stated in the hearing on 
March 3, 1999. 
2. The plans at issue in this trial, which were submitted to Brighton Corporation 
for review in June 1999, did not comply with the settlement agreement. Accordingly, 
Brighton Corporation properly rejected those plans. Brighton correctly determined that the 
plans submitted in October 1999 were not properly presented for review and did not review 
them. Accordingly, those plans were not considered during the trial. 
3. There was inadequate communication between the parties, which the Court finds 
was principally caused by Ward. In particular, the Court finds that both Ward and his 
architect, Kimble Shaw, knew that the plans submitted to Brighton Corporation in June 1999 
were not final plans, but neither Ward nor Shaw ever advised Brighton of that fact, even after 
receiving Brighton's rejection letter dated June 23, 1999, which made clear that Brighton 
believed it had reviewed (and rejected) final plans. 
4. The Court finds, based on Mary Barton's scheduled medical treatment out of the 
area and on Defendant's stipulation that a four-month period of repose was reasonable under 
01691 
2 
the circumstances, that Brighton is entitled to a period of repose from November 19, 1999 until 
April 1, 2000, during which no plans shall be submitted to Brighton for review. 
5. Brighton requested, pursuant to the settlement agreement, that Ward remove all 
plans currently on file or in the possession of Salt Lake County building and zoning authorities. 
The parties are to determine the effect of removing the plans and either remove them or apply 
to the Court for further guidance on that issue. 
DATED this 3 - day of December, 199ft 
Approved as to form: 
PARRY, ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
Douglas J. Parry 
James K. Tracy 
3 01692 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage 
prepaid, on this Y ~ day of December, 1999 to the following: 
Douglas J. Parry, Esq. 
James K. Tracy, Esq. 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
60 East South Temple, #1270 




FOOTHILLS AND CANYONS OVERLAY ZONE 
A. Lot and Density Requirements 
B. Slope Protection Standards 
C. Grading Standards 
D. Streets / Roads and General Site Access 
E. Driveways 
F. Trail Access 
G. Fences 
H. Tree and Vegetation Protection 
I. Natural Hazards 
J. Stream Corridor and Wetlands Protection 
I\L Wildlife Habitat Protection 
L. Si te D e v e l o p m e n t and Design S t a n d a r d s 
M. Traffic 
Lot and Density Requirements. 
1. General Rule. All development in the Foothills and Canyons Overlay 
Zone shall comply with the standards for minimum lot size, minimum 
lot width, and maximum density required in the underlying zone 
2. Exception to the General Rule-When Underlying Zone Permits Smaller 
than 1-Acre Lots. 
a. Lots Created After the Effective Date of this Ordinance. If the 
Figure 4. Intrusive Ridgeline Development Generally Prohibited 
4. Steep Slopes-Open Space. One hundred (100) percent of areas with 
slope greater than thirty (30) percent shall remain in natural private or 
public open space, except as expressly allowed in this Chapter. 
Grading Standaxds. 
1 Grading Prohibited Without Prior Approvals/Permits. No grading, excavation, or 
tree/vegetation removal shall be permitted, whether to provide for a building site, 
for on-site utilities or services, or for any roads or driveways, prior to issuance of a 
building permit in accordance with a grading and excavation plan and report for the 
site approved by the Development Services Engineer. 
2 Cutting to Create Benches. Cutting and grading to create benches or pads for 
additional or larger building sites shall be avoided to the maximum extent feasible. 
(Sec Figures 5 and 6 below.) 
IB 
Figure 6. Excessive Cutting: Discouraged 
3 Limits on Changing Natural Grade. The original, natural grade of a lot 
shall not be raised or lowered more than four (4) feet at anv point for 
construction of anv structure or improvement, except: 
a The site's original grade may be raised or lowered a maximum 
of six (6) feet if retaining walls are used to reduce the 
steepness of man-made slopes, provided that the retaining 
walls comply with the requirements set forth in this section. 
b. The site's original grade may be raised or lowered more than 
six (6) feet with terracing, as specified in Section 
19.72.030.C8.b. 
4. Grading for Accessory Building Pads Discouraged. Separate building 
pads for accessory buildings and structures other than garages, such as 
tennis courts, swimming pools, outbuildings, and similar facilities, shall 
be discouraged except where the natural slope is twenty (20) percent or 
less. 
5. Limits on Graded or Filled Man-Made Slopes. 
a. Slopes of twenty-five (25) percent or less are greatly 
encouraged wherever possible. 
b. Graded or filled man-made slopes shall not exceed a slope of 
fifty (50) percent. 
c. Cut man-made surfaces or slopes shall not exceed a slope of 
fifty (50) percent unless it is substantiated, on the basis of a 
site investigation and submittal of a soils engineering or 
geotechnical report prepared and certified by qualified 
professional, that a cut at a steeper slope will be stable and 
wall not create a hazard to public or private property. 
d. All cut, filled, and graded slopes shall be recontoured to the 
natural, varied contour of the surrounding terrain. 
6. Revegetation Required. Any slope exposed or created in new 
development shall be landscaped or revegetated pursuant to the 
standards and provisions set forth in Section 19.72.030.H., "Tree and 
Vegetation Protection," below. 
7. Excavation. Excavation for footings and foundations shall be minimized 
to the maximum extent feasible in order to lessen site disturbance and 
ensure compatibility with hillside and sloped terrain. Intended 
excavation must be supported by detailed engineering plans submitted as 
part of the application for site plan approval. 
8. Retaining walls. Use of retaining walls is encouraged to reduce the 
steepness of man-made slopes and to provide planting pockets conducive 
to revegetation. (See Figure 7 below.) 
a. Retaining walls may be permitted to support steep slopes but 
shall not exceed six (6) feet in height from the finished grade, 
except where terraced as specified in subsection (b) below. 
b. Terracing shall be limited to two tiers. The width of the 
terrace between any two four-foot vertical retaining walls shall 
be at least three (3) feet. Retaining walls higher than four (4) 
feet shall be separated from any other retaining wall by a 
minimum of five (5) horizontal feet. Terraces created between 
retaining walls shall be permanently landscaped or 
revegetated pursuant to §19.72.030.H., "Tree and Vegetation 
Protection," of this Chapter. 
c. Retaining walls shall be faced with stone or earth-colored 
materials similar to the surrounding natural landscape. (Sec 
Chapter 19.73, "Foothills and Canyons Site Development and 
Design Standards.") 
d. All retaining walls shall comply with the Uniform Building 
Code, except that when any provision of this section conflicts 
with any provision set forth in the UBC, the more restrictive 
provision shall apply. 
Figure 7. 4l High Retaining Walls Require 3* Minimum 
Horizontal Separation 
Retaining Walls Higher than 4' Require a Minimum 
5' of Horizontal Separation 
Filling or Dredging of Waterways Prohibited. Filling or dredging of water 
courses, wetlands, gullies, stream beds, or stormwater runoff channels is 
prohibited, except that bridge construction is allowed pursuant to the 
standards set forth in Section 19.72.030.1.7. below. 
10. Detention/Stormwater Facilities. Where detention basins and other 
storm and erosion control facilities may be required, any negative visual 
and aesthetic impacts on the natural landscape and topography shall be 
minimized to the maximum extent feasible. (See Figures 8 and 9.) 
(Ord. 966 3, 1986: (part) of Ord. passed 9/25/80: prior code 23-35-4) 
